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NOTES
The Primary Runoff: Racism's Reprieve?
During his 1984 bid for the presidency, the Reverend Jesse Jackson focused
national attention on primary runoffs;1 his insistent challenge to this electoral
device highlighted the potential for discrimination inherent in majority vote re-
quirements. Currently, ten southern states require runoffs between the top two
candidates in primaries if the leading vote-getter fails to obtain a majority of the
votes.2 This mechanism often forces black candidates into head-to-head con-
frontations against white candidates, maximizing the impact of racially po-
larized voting.3 This dual primary system thus denies black candidates the
I. A number of states have primary runoff systems, under which the top two vote-getters in
the initial primary run against each other in a second primary if neither received a majority of the
votes in the first primary. See infra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. Reverend Jackson pressed the
attack on runoffs throughout his campaign. See, eg., Jackson, Moving to the Common Ground,
Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1984, at C7, col. 2. At times he appeared to condition his continued support
for the eventual Democratic ticket on the adoption of a platform plank calling for the elimination of
second primaries. See, eg., Roberts, Concern Over Jackson Runoff Stand, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16,
1984, at A18, col. 3. After a bitter fight at the Democratic Convention, however, Reverend Jackson
and his followers accepted a platform including only a promise to study dual primaries and to seek
the elimination of those with discriminatory effects. See Weaver, Mondale Meets with Rivals on
Unity Bid, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1984, at A13, col. 1.
2. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES 1985-1986, at 206 (1986).
The following states require runoff primaries: ALA. CODE § 17-16-36 (West Supp. 1986); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 3-110(a) (1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.091 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
501 (Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-111 (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-103 (Supp.
1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-11-10,-13-50,-17-600,-17-610 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1985); TEx.
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 172.003, -.004 (Vernon 1986). Mississippi also requires a second primary;
however, the history behind Mississippi's requirement is confusing. Mississippi apparently tried on a
number of occasions to enact an open primary system. In 1982, however, these efforts were repealed
and a primary runoff system was enacted. See Act of Apr. 22, 1982, ch. 477, §§ 1, 7, 1982 Miss.
Laws 626, 628 (adopting the primary runoff system and repealing a 1979 effort to adopt an open
primary system).
Louisiana has a unique "open primary" in which candidates from both parties participate in a
general election, followed by a runoff if no candidate wins a majority. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18:451 to :483 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986); see Theodoulou, The Impact of the Open Elections
System and Runoff Primary: A Case Study of Louisiana Electoral Politics 1975-1984, 17 URB. LAW.
457, 459 (1985). Prior to 1975 Louisiana held primaries featuring majority vote requirements simi-
lar to those in most southern states. Id.
New York City requires candidates to'win 40% of the primary vote before receiving the nomi-
nation for citywide office. In Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1548-50 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986), a federal judge found that
this rule violated both the federal Voting Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit subse-
quently reversed the district court's holding. Butts, 779 F.2d at 143, 151. For a discussion of Butts,
see infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 183-93.
3. The second primary accentuates the effect of racial bloc voting by minimizing ideological
differences between white candidates and emphasizing the race factor. Those white voters who are
blinded by racist sentiments can vote for the candidate of their choice in the opening primary and
rely on the probability that they will still be able to vote against the black candidate in the runoff.
This segment of the white population is, in effect, given a veto over black nominations.
Although a majority vote requirement disadvantages any cohesive voting minority, the runoff
most often operates against blacks because it currently exists only in the South. In Texas and Flor-
ida, however, sizeable hispanic communities also confront this electoral barrier. See, eg., White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973). Even though women are not a minority, many commentators
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
benefit of an ideological split among white voters and gives racism a second
chance to thwart the political aims of black candidates and their supporters.
Examples of runoffs between black and white candidates illustrate the dis-
criminatory results of majority vote requirements. In 1978 James Clyburn,
Commissioner of-the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission, won forty-
three percent of the vote in the Democratic primary for South Carolina's Secre-
tary of State.4 Despite this strong support, he lost the nomination to a white
opponent in the ensuing runoff.5 In 1982 H. M. (Mickey) Michaux, a former
state representative and United States attorney, led the first primary for the
Democratic nomination for the Second Congressional District of North Caro-
lina with forty-four percent of the vote;6 his effort to gain election as North
Carolina's first black congressman since 1902 ended in a racially polarized run-
off against his white adversary. 7 In contrast, Harold Washington, a former con-
gressman, defeated Richard Daly and incumbent Jane Byrne by a plurality in
the Democratic primary and in 1983 became Chicago's first black mayor.8
This Note discusses the history behind majority vote requirements and pri-
mary runoffs, and considers the role played by these electoral schemes in south-
ern politics. The first section of the Note traces the development of majority
vote requirements. Section II chronicles the lack of systematic studies of the
impact majority vote requirements have on the political influence of minorities.
Sections III and IV discuss potential legal challenges to such requirements under
the United States Constitution and the Federal Voting Rights Act, respectively.
Section V considers various arguments put forth in support of primary runoffs
and discusses political considerations involved in the debate over their continued
existence. The Note argues that, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary,
majority vote requirements and primary runoffs were created as a means of sti-
fling black political influence in the South. Moreover, it contends that argu-
ments in support of the continued use of primary runoffs are unpersuasive. The
Note also suggests that majority vote requirements and primary runoffs may be
vulnerable to legal challenges; particularly to challenges brought under the Vot-
ing Rights Act. However, the Note concludes that federal legislation prohibit-
ing majority vote requirements is necessary before blacks can participate fully in
the political process.
also argue that women must overcome heightened sexism in runoffs against male opponents. Voting
Rights Act: Runoff Primaries and Registration Barriers: Oversight Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 293 (1984)
[hereinafter Hearings] (Eleanor Smeal Report).
4. Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 (testimony of James Clyburn, Comm'r, S.C. Human Affairs
Comm'n).
5. Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 (testimony of James Clyburn, Comm'r, S.C. Human Affairs
Comm'n).
6. McDonald, The Majority Vote Requirement: Its Use and Abuse in the South, 17 URB. LAW.
429, 432 (1985).
7. Id.
8. See Preston, The Election of Harold Washington: Black Voting Patterns in the 1983 Chicago
Mayoral Race, 16 POL. Sci. 486, 486-88 (1983) (noting that Washington was the first black elected
mayor of Chicago and discussing his margin of victory in the primary and the general election).
[Vol. 65
PRIMAR Y RUNOFFS
I. MAJORITY VOTE REQUIREMENTS AND PRIMARY RUNOFFS: A
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Majority vote requirements originated during the Post-Reconstruction Pe-
riod as a component of the white primary.9 Because the runoff developed by
party rule before being codified, it is difficult to pinpoint the precisb dates of its
genesis. However, certain dates are known. Louisiana held the first primary in
1892.10 South Carolina experimented with a primary in the 1892 gubernatorial
race, and in 1896 the South Carolina Democratic Party established a rule pro-
viding for primaries featuring runoffs.1" In 1902 Mississippi became the first
state to pass legislation requiring primaries and runoffs. 1 2 By 1903 a majority of
southern states held primaries, and these primaries generally included majority
vote requirements. 13 Statutes requiring runoffs, most of which simply enacted
pre-existing party rules, soon followed. 14
During the years immediately preceding the emergence of the dual primary,
southern states frantically sought to circumvent the fifteenth amendment15 by
calling constitutional conventions, amending their constitutions, or passing stat-
utes to disenfranchise blacks through such mechanisms as the literacy test and
the poll tax.1 6 Consequently, it has been argued that majority vote requirements
were not intended to discriminate against blacks because efforts to disen-
franchise blacks had already proven successful.
17
9. See McDonald, supra note 6, at 430; see also Kousser, The Historical Origins of the Run-off
Primary, 91 THE CRISIS 392, 393 (1984) (indicating that runoffs emerged as part of primaries and,
like primaries, were developed initially by party rules), reprinted from JOINT CENTER FOR POL.
STUDIES, INC., Focus, October 1984.
10. Kousser, supra note 9, at 392.
11. C. WOODWARD, A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at
372 n. 11 (1966); Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
12. E.g., Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
13. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 372. Woodward provides the following dates of estab-
lishment for primaries in the South: South Carolina, 1896; Arkansas, 1897; Georgia, 1898; Florida
and Tennessee, 1901; Alabama and Mississippi, 1902; Kentucky and Tennessee, 1905; Louisiana,
1906; Oklahoma, 1907; Virginia, 1913; and North Carolina, 1915. Id. at 372 n.ll. Woodward does
not distinguish between those primaries created by party rule and those established by statute.
Under a majority vote requirement a second primary is held between the top two vote-getters in
the initial primary if the winner receives less than 50% of the vote.
14. Professor V. 0. Key, Jr., gives the following dates of enactment for runoff statutes: Missis-
sippi, 1902; North Carolina and South Carolina, 1915; Georgia, 1917; Texas, 1918; Louisiana, 1922;
Florida, 1929; Alabama, 1931; and Arkansas, 1933 (abandoned in 1935 and reenacted in 1939). V.
KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 417 n.18 (1st ed. 1949). But see Kousser, supra
note 9, at 394 (indicating that Louisiana's runoff statute was first adopted in 1906).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The fifteenth amendment provides that "the right of citizens...
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by ... any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." Id.
16. Disenfranchise, or disfranchise, means "to deprive of any franchise, as of the right of voting
in elections .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (5th ed. 1979). Disenfranchising constitutional
conventions were held in the following states and years: Mississippi, 1890; South Carolina, 1895;
and Louisiana, 1898. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 321. Disenfranchising constitutional
amendments were adopted in the following states and years: North Carolina, 1900; Alabama, 1901;
Virginia, 1901-02; Georgia, 1908; and Oklahoma, 1910. Id. Tennessee, Florida, Arkansas, and
Texas passed the poll tax by statute. Id.
17. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 4, 14 n.1 (testimony of Lorn Foster, Senior Fellow, Joint
Center for Pol. Studies) (citing Julian Bond as a "leading proponent" of the view that majority vote
requirements were not intended to discriminate against blacks). But see C. WOODWARD, supra note
1987]
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One commentator maintains that primary runoffs were created without ra-
cial motivation, arguing that the "prime considerations in the adoption of the
run-off have been attachment to the abstract idea of majority nomination
... ,118 Attributing the impetus for the primary runoff to progressive reform,
others point to the overwhelming success of the literacy test and the poll tax in
removing blacks from voter lists. 19 In Louisiana, for example, 130,344 blacks,
or 44% of the electorate, were registered to vote in 1897.20 By 1900 that
number had tumbled to 5320, or 4% of the electorate.2 1 Given the success of
these measures, black voters presented little threat to white Democrats-at any
rate, not enough to spark a reaction such as creating the dual primary system.
Moreover, Democratic primaries, from the outset, were intended for whites
only.22
The primary, like the recall23 and the initiative,24 embodies the Populists'2 5
and later, the Progressives' 2 6 effort to democratize American politics by taking
power away from party machines, political bosses, and monopoly capitalists and
restoring it to the people.27 According to Professor V. 0. Key, Jr., the primary
originated in the South because of the domination of politics by white Demo-
11, at 372 (describing the primary as an "implied pledge of the disfranchisers that once the Negro
was removed from political life the white men would be given more voice in the selection of their
rulers").
18. V. KEY, supra note 14, at 422.
19. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 4, 14 n.1 (testimony of Lorn Foster, Senior Fellow, Joint
Center for Pol. Studies) (noting this argument and citing Julian Bond as one of its leading
proponents).
20. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 342.
21. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 342.
22. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 342.
23. A recall is a process by which voters are able to remove an elected official prior to the
completion of his or her "term of office by a vote of the people... taken on the filing of a petition
signed by [the] required number of qualified voters." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1139 (5th ed.
1979).
24. An initiative is a process by which voters are able to bypass the legislative branch and enact
laws or amend state constitutions by voting directly on measures initiated by petition of a sufficient
number of registered voters. See id. at 705.
25. A series of agricultural depressions beginning in the late 1860s, combined with monopoly
control of services essential to farmers, spawned various farmer organizations dedicated to political
and economic reform. See 2 S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER & V. LEUCHTENBURG, A CONCISE His-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 428-437 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter S. MORISON]; C. WOOD-
WARD, supra note 11, at 176-204. These alliances led to the development of a new political party-
the Populists. See S. MORISON, supra, at 435-39; C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 235-45. The
Populist party emerged in the 1890s as farmers and laborers sought to wrest power from various
special interests that had accumulated vast wealth and influence during the nineteenth century. See
S. MORISON, supra, at 437-449; C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 235-50; see also infra notes 53-67
and accompanying text (discussing the rise and fall of the Populist movement in the South).
26. The Progressives were middle-class reformers who sought to solve the social problems af-
flicting the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by regulating eco-
nomic monopolies and by restoring popular control over political monopolies. See S. MORISON,
supra note 25, at 499-510; see also C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 369-77 (discussing the Progres-
sive movement in the South). The Progressive movement began in the 1890s and grew strong as the
Populist wave subsided. See C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 369-74. In general, the Progressives
differed from the Populists in that they adopted a less radical approach to reform and attracted their
members from the urban middle class. See id.
27. See C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 372-74.
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crats.2 8 Professor Key has noted that "[u]nder one-party conditions, the logic of
majority decision makes the run-off primary a concomitant of the direct pri-
mary." 29 Thus, when one party dominates the political scene to such an extent
that its nominees invariably win election, democratic principles arguably de-
mand that candidates be "nominated" by primaries and not by conventions or
caucuses controlled by a powerful few. It is unclear, however, that similar rea-
soning applies to majority vote requirements.
The opposing position perceives the second primary as a device designed to
"strengthen the primary itself as a means of solidifying the southern Democratic
parties against opposition, and particularly opposition by blacks or through ap-
peals to blacks."'30 As noted previously, two related conclusions concerning
southern political history during the period in which the runoff emerged anchor
the arguments that deny racial motivation in the development of majority vote
requirements. First, that the South's status as a one-party region had become
irreversibly entrenched, and second, that the spectre of black political power had
been eliminated by the poll tax and the literacy test. However, Professor J. Mor-
gan Kousser, one of the leading proponents of the view citing racism as the
source of the second primary, marshals strong historical evidence to loosen these
moorings. 3 1
In 1890 a majority of black males voted in nine of the eleven ex-Confederate
states.32 In ten of those states a majority of blacks voted Republican. 33 Any
significant white support for Republicans resulted in defeat for white Demo-
crats. 34 In this manner blacks acted as "arbiter between white factions" and
exercised considerable political leverage during the late nineteenth century.3 5
To illustrate this political influence Professor Kousser points to Virginia where a
coalition of black Republicans and disaffected Democrats controlled the state
from 1879 to 1883.36 In North Carolina, George White, a black Republican,
was elected to Congress in 1898. 37
28. V. KEY, supra note 14, at 416.
29. V. KEY, supra note 14, at 417. Arguably, democracy demands nomination by primaries in
the context of one-party politics. It is unclear, however, that the same logic dictates majority vote
requirements. Plurality rule, not majority control, arguably represents the true American tradition.
See id.; Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (testimony of James Clybum, Comm'r, S.C. Human Affairs
Comm'n).
30. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394.
31. Kousser, supra note 9, at 392-94; see also McDonald, supra note 6, at 430-32 (also finding
discriminatory motives behind the adoption of primary runoffs).
32. Kousser, supra note 9, at 392.
33. Kousser, supra note 9, at 392.
34. Kousser, supra note 9, at 392.
35. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 347.
36. Kousser, supra note 9, at 392-93.
37. M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1984, at 875 (1983).
Blacks also continued to exercise political influence in South Carolina. In 1900, four years after
South Carolina Democrats had adopted a primary runoff by party rule, a black, J.W. Bolts, was
elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives. See Kousser, supra note 9, at 394 (provid-
ing date of South Carolina's first runoff provision); McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Dis-franchisement of Blacks in South Carolina, 37 S.C.L. REv. 557, 568-69 (1986); see also G. TINDALL,
SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES 1877-1900, at 309-10 app. (1952) (listing black members of South Car-
olina General Assembly after Reconstruction).
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Even after disenfranchisement a significant number of blacks managed to
retain their voting rights. In Mississippi nine percent of blacks were registered
in 1896;38 in South Carolina and Virginia between fourteen and fifteen percent
of blacks remained on voter lists in 1904.39 According to Professor Kousser,
blacks in Mississippi continued to shift the balance between warring white fac-
tions as late as 1900.40
During the period in which the runoff entered the political scene, "the per-
ceived fragility of the disenfranchisement settlement" 41 prevented white Demo-
crats from relaxing their efforts to stifle black political power.42 Moreover,
during the time that dual primaries arose white supremacists could not be cer-
tain that the United States Supreme Court would be so acquiescent to the
South's concerted effort to skirt the commands of the fifteenth amendment.43
Although the poll tax and the literacy test continued to deprive blacks of the
right to vote until 1966,44 the grandfather clause45 fell to constitutional chal-
lenge in 1915.46 In addition, the Supreme Court in 1927 held that Texas' white
primary statute47 was unconstitutional. 48
White fear of Republican power-fueled by black votes-continued long
after the Compromise of 187749 ended Republican domination of the South and
38. Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
39. Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
40. See Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
41. Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
42. Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
43. See Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
44. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that poll tax violates
equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) (affirming congressional power to suspend use of literacy tests); see also Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970) (validating Congress' nationwide suspension of literacy tests); Davis v. Schnell,
81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.) (affirming invalidation of a literacy test including an "understanding"
clause), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
45. To prevent literacy tests and poll taxes from disenfranchising significant numbers of white
voters, southern Democrats devised the "grandfather clause," which "exempted from the literacy
and property tests those entitled to vote on [a date when only whites were eligible to vote], together
with their sons and grandsons." C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 334.
46. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that grandfather clause violates fif-
teenth amendment).
47. White primaries typically were established by "formal rules passed pursuant to statutory
delegations of the power to prescribe qualifications for voting in primaries, [by which] the Demo-
cratic party limited participation in them to white voters .. " Marshall, The Rise and Collapse of
the "White Democratic Primary, " 26 J. NEGRO EDUC. 249, 249-50 (1957).
48. Nixon v. Hernion, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (white primary statute held unconstitu-
tional under fourteenth amendment). In Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 84-89 (1932), the Supreme
Court held that the exclusion of blacks from primaries by a committee of a state political party (as
opposed to the party convention), when carried out with authority delegated by statute, violated the
fourteenth amendment. In Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53 (1935), the Supreme Court allowed
a white primary mandated by party rule, finding no state action. However, the Court reversed itself
in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944), holding that a white primary, even if mandated
by party rule, violates the fifteenth amendment.
49. The 1876 presidential election between Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and Democrat
Samuel J. Tilden ended in a hopelessly disputed deadlock. See S. MORISON, supra note 25, at 354-
55; see also C. WOODWARD, REUNION & REACTION (1966) (discussing the election in considerable
detail). Four states returned two sets of ballots, each naming different victors. S. MORISON, supra
note 25, at 355. The outcome thus depended on whether the Republicans or the Democrats con-
trolled the ballot counting. Id. Southern Democrats agreed to allow the Republicans to manipulate
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after disenfranchising schemes reduced the number of black voters. 50 In 1900
Mississippi Governor Thomas Longino, rallying support for a mandatory pri-
mary, reminded legislators of black political influence during Reconstruction
and of the potential for its re-emergence due to white factionalism. 51 After not-
ing the "importance of intelligent supremacy in the government" and its "[de-
pendence] upon white political unity," Governor Longino argued: "if we would
perpetuate white political union, the time appears opportune for the passage of a
uniform compulsory primary ... with a provision that only qualified electors
[i.e., white males] shall vote in the primary .... -52
Moreover, even as Republican power waned, another means of black polit-
ical leverage spread. Organized southern farmers burst on the political scene in
the 1880s. Working within the Democratic party, by 1890 the Southern Alli-
ance53 controlled eight state legislatures and had elected six governors and fifty
congressmen.5 4 By 1892 a genuine third party had emerged.5 5 The Populists
sought to bring monopoly power in financial markets, railroads, and communi-
cations under governmental control and to inflate the money supply: 56 an
agenda that appealed to poor farmers. 57
The Populists actively pursued black support. Tom Watson, one of the
foremost southern Populists, argued that "the accident of color can make no
difference in the interest of farmers, croppers, and laborers." s5 8 Addressing
mixed audiences, he said: "You are kept apart that you may be separately
fleeced of your earnings."' 59 Southern Populists included blacks in their party
organizations and at political rallies, and they "denounced lynch law and the
the vote count to declare H-ayes president in return for the Republicans' promise to end federal
enforcement of Reconstruction and to allow white southern Democrats to dominate blacks in the
South. Id. at 355-56.
50. See C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 42-46.
51. Hearings, supra note 3, at 24-25 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights) (quoting Governor Thomas Longino, address to the Mississippi Legislature, regular session,
January, February, March, 1900, Tuesday June 16, 1900).
52. Hearings, supra note 3, at 24-25 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
53. The Southern Alliance was a powerful political organization of southern farmers that grew
out of the economic hardships afflicting farmers throughout the post- Civil War era. See S. MORI-
SON, supra note 25, at 437. The development of the Southern Alliance paralleled the development of
similar organizations in the Midwest and West. See id. at 431-37. In the West farmer organizations
established a third political party beginning in 1890. Id. at 437. In the South, however, the South-
ern Alliance initially sought political influence through the Democratic party. See C. WOODWARD,
supra note 11, at 235. When this strategy stalled the Southern Alliance disintegrated, and the Popu-
list party moved into the South as southern farmers joined forces with organized labor. Id. at 234-
47.
54. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 235.
55. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 245.
56. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 250.
57. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 246-47. The Populists also aligned with the labor move-
ment. Id. at 252-53.
58. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 257 (quoting Tom Watson). Woodward cautions that
progress in race relations within the Populist party are easily exaggerated. Id. at 258. The extent of
black political power within the Populist party, however, was not nearly as important as was the
perception among white Democrats of the threat of black political leverage. The Populist party
undoubtedly helped foster such fear.
59. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 257 (quoting Tom Watson).
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convict lease and called for the defense of the Negro's political rights." 60
Although the Populists achieved a degree of success in the 1892 elections,6 1
by 1894 Republicans and Populists in North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Loui-
siana, and Arkansas had agreed to join forces in "Fusion" movements.62
Shortly thereafter similar coalitions were formed in Virginia and Texas.63 In
1894 Alabama Fusionists elected four members to Congress and loosened the
Democratic stranglehold on the legislature. 64 Georgia Fusionists elected five
state senators and forty-seven representatives to the legislature.65 In North Car-
olina Fusionists controlled the state legislature from 1894 to 1898-this power
enabled them to select both of the state's senators.6 6 However, the Populists'
power was short lived. In 1898 the intense nationalism ignited by the Spanish-
American War consumed the Populists' fire in most of the South.67
Historians Key and Woodward argue that the decline of the Populist party
and the resulting return of the South to one party politics explain the motiva-
tions behind the direct primary. 68 It is equally plausible, however, that by
ensuring Democratic unity, the primary-bolstered by a majority vote require-
ment-helped guarantee that the Populist party would never completely recover
from its 1898 setbacks. Moreover, the existence of any potential avenue for
black political influence supports the argument that the primary runoff was
designed to discriminate against blacks. The Republican-Populist Fusion move-
ment created an avenue for such influence, and this movement clearly was fresh
in the minds of those who developed the majority vote requirement.
Those who tie the creation of the direct primary and the runoff to progres-
sive reform point out that these mechanisms allow competing factions to settle
their differences within the party and without hopelessly dividing the party's
rank and file.69 In the context of southern political history, this justification
appears to be an apology for a device designed to prevent appeals by white Dem-
ocrats to black voters and to unify Democrats against the Fusionist opposition.
In 1899 after surveying opinions in three states that had disenfranchised blacks,
60. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 256-57.
61. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 258-63.
62. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 276.
63. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 276.
64. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 277.
65. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 278.
66. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 359 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (discussing Fusionists'
control of the North Carolina General Assembly), aff'd in part and rey'd in part sub nom. Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986); C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 377 (discussing the
Fusionists' ability to select the state's senators).
67. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 369. But see Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 359
(E.D.N.C. 1984) (attributing Fusionists' loss of control of the North Carolina General Assembly in
1898 to white Democrats' depiction of Populists as dominated by blacks), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
68. See V. KEY, supra note 14, at 416; C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 372-73. It should be
noted, however, that Key relies on the dates of the statutes to determine the dates of the various
runoff provisions. V. KEY, supra note 14, at 417 n.18. The fallacy of this argument lies in the fact
most majority vote requirements were developed under party rules before being enacted as statutes.
See Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
69. V. KEY, supra note 14, at 423.
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a North Carolina editor wrote, "'without the legal primary, division among
white men might result in... a return to the deplorable conditions when one
faction of white men call upon the Negroes to help defeat another faction.' ",70
The chief proponent of Mississippi's runoff statute wrote: "'White supremacy
could be maintained only by the members of that race, remaining together politi-
cally, otherwise comparatively few Negroes who are qualified to vote might
wield the balance of power.' -71
Woodward argues that the direct primary and the majority vote require-
ment result from a "paradoxical combination of white supremacy and progres-
sivism."'7 2 However, an alternative argument can be made. Under this
argument only the primary itself should be regarded as an example of enlight-
ened reform. The majority vote requirement, in contrast, should be recognized
as a discriminatory device designed to overwhelm black political influence-
whether exercised independently through Republican-Populist combinations or
used as a lever to obtain concessions from white Democrats willing to seek black
support. The majority vote requirement relates more directly to the goal of
guaranteeing white unity than it does to the objective of conferring control of a
party on its rank and file.
II. LACK OF SYkSTEMATIC STUDIES IN THIS AREA
In addition to the highly publicized Michaux and Clyburn contests, there
are many examples of promising black candidates winning pluralities in prima-
ries but losing to white opponents in runoffs.73 In 1968 Charles Evers lost a
runoff to a white candidate after leading the first primary for the Third Congres-
sional District of Mississippi.74 Similarly, in 1974 James Meredith won a plural-
ity in the Fourth Congressional District Democratic primary in Mississippi, but
dropped out of the race, rather than face a runoff, after the Mississippi Supreme
Court refused to allow him to run as an independent. 75 Running for the same
seat in 1980, Henry Curtsy led the first primary, but lost to a white candidate in
the second primary. 76 Armand Derfner, a civil rights attorney, reportedly has
unearthed over fifty similar incidents in Mississippi.77 In North Carolina How-
ard Lee won a plurality in the 1976 Democratic primary for lieutenant governor
70. Kousser, supra note 9, at 393 (quoting a North Carolina editor who surveyed public opin-
ion in 1899).
71. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394 (quoting Edward F. Noel, chief sponsor of 1902 Mississippi
law adopting primary election with runoff requirement).
72. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 373. In the South the "irony" of political "reforms" that
diminish the voting rights of blacks is all too familiar. McDonald, supra note 6, at 431 & n.14
(pointing to Justice Marshall's frequent recognition of this theme).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
74. See McDonald, supra note 6, at 432 n.15.
75. Hearings, supra note 3, at 46 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
76. Hearings, supra note 3, at 46 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
77. See Roberts, supra note 1 (reporting Derfner's findings at more than 50). But see McDon-
ald, supra note 6, at 433 & nn.6, 17 (placing the same findings at over 100).
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before being eliminated by a white opponent in the subsequent primary.78 Sig-
nificantly, majority vote requirements also have a disparate impact on female
participation in the political process. Eleanor Smeal analyzed sixty congres-
sional and gubernatorial elections that involved women in nine states with ma-
jority vote requirements. She found that women lost to male opponents in six of
the eight runoffs involving a male candidate and a female candidate. 79 In all six
defeats the female candidate had won a plurality in the initial primary.80
Although the numerous examples of minorities winning primaries by plu-
ralities and then losing to white candidates in runoffs illustrate the potentially
discriminatory results of majority vote requirements, few systematic studies have
examined the overall effects of second primaries. 8 ' Steve Suitts, Executive Di-
rector of the Southern Regional Council, explains that state election officials do
not maintain data on primary returns and that local newspapers provide the
only source of the necessary data.82 Similarly, Charles Bullock and Loch John-
son, political scientists at the University of Georgia, report that lists of minority
candidates are unavailable. 83
Some studies have been conducted, however. Bullock and Johnson ana-
lyzed 215 runoffs held in Georgia between 1965 and 1982 for governor, lieuten-
ant governor, secretary of state, the state legislature, and the United States
Congress.84 They found that only seven runoffs involved head-to-head confron-
tations between black and white candidates. 85 Of the three runoffs in which
black candidates who had led the initial primary participated, the leader pre-
vailed in two of the second primaries. 86 This finding is consistent with the
study's conclusions regarding front-runners in general; sixty- eight percent of the
primary leaders went on to win in the runoffs. 87 Females won ten of the eleven
runoffs that they entered after winning a plurality in the initial primary. 88
The Georgia study is subject to criticism on several fronts. First, as the
authors recognized, the size of the sample is too small to provide reliable conclu-
sions. 89 Further, the fact only seven runoffs involved black-white confrontations
may be due in part to the reluctance of black politicians to run for office know-
ing that they may be forced to overcome an expensive, racially charged runoff to
win nomination. This fact may also be explained, in part, by the date chosen to
begin the study-1965, a time when black political power in Georgia was mini-
78. Lanier, The Runoff Primary: A Path to Victory, N.C. INSIGHT, June 1983, at 18, 22 (1983).
79. Hearings, supra note 3, at 293-94 app. 2 (Eleanor Smeal Report).
80. Hearings, supra note 3, at 293-94 app. 2 (Eleanor Smeal Report).
81. E.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 67 (testimony of Steve Suitts, Executive Director, Southern
Regional Council).
82. Hearings, supra note 3, at 67-68 (testimony of Steve Suitts, Executive Director, Southern
Regional Council).
83. Bullock & Johnson, Runoff Elections in Georgia, 47 POL. Sci. 937, 944 n.6 (1985).
84. Id. at 940.
85. Id. at 944.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 940.
88. Id. at 944.
89. Id.
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mal.90 Second, the authors did not indicate the racial composition of the dis-
tricts in which the runoffs won by black candidates took place. If any of these
three contests were held in a majority black district, the relevant conclusions
would change drastically because a majority vote requirement operates to the
detriment of the minority race, whatever its color. Third, the authors also ne-
glected to analyze their own data fully. They omitted the most important com-
parison: that between the success rate of black candidates who won pluralities
in initial primaries in black-white runoffs in majority white districts and the suc-
cess rate of white front-runners in all-white runoffs in majority white districts.
This comparison would better isolate the racial factor. The authors indicated
that no black candidate won any of the four black-white runoffs following a
primary won by a white candidate, but they did not contrast this finding with
the fact a white runner-up won one of the three black-white runoffs following
primaries won by a black candidate. 9 1 Although the size of the sample makes
this data inconclusive, white runners'-up success rate of thirty-three percent is
substantially better than that of black runners'-up: zero. Rather than consider
this fact, the authors chose to compare the black front-runners' success rate of
sixty-six percent to the success rate of the leaders-black and white-of prima-
ries preceding black-white runoffs: eighty-six percent.92 This comparison obvi-
ously mutes the relevant conclusion by offsetting the success of one white
runner-up against the failures of all black runners-up. Moreover, a quantitative
analysis, although certainly relevant, can be somewhat misleading. The majority
vote requirement's disincentive effect is immeasurable. Thus, the real inquiry
concerns the existence, not the extent, of a racially discriminatory impact. Most
states requiring runoffs have not elected blacks to Congress or to statewide office
since disenfranchisement. Against this background a disparate impact of any
size is substantial.
At least one study has looked at the operation of second primaries in North
Carolina. 93 Although this study focused on the respective results of various leg-
islative proposals before the North Carolina General Assembly, 94 the racial con-
sequences of runoffs in North Carolina can be gleaned from the work. The
90. Id. at 940.
91. Id. at 944.
92. Id.
93. See Lanier, supra note 78, at 22.
94. Lanier, supra note 78, at 18. Legislative proposals that would change the majority vote
requirement to rules requiring between 40% and 50% of the vote have been introduced but rejected
in North Carolina. Id. In 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly considered five proposals to
modify the majority vote requirement. These proposals recommended lowering the threshold re-
quirement for winning nomination from 50% to a lower percentage, and some included a specified
margin of victory. The proposals were: (1) a 40% requirement; (2) a 42% requirement; (3) a 45%
requirement combined with a 15% margin of victory; (4) a 40% requirement combined with a 5%
margin of victory; and (5) a 41% requirement combined with a 3% margin of victory. Id. at 19.
In 1986 black legislators in North Carolina again launched a campaign to lower the percentage
of votes necessary to avoid a runoff from 50% to 40%. See Christensen, Primary runoff change
draws support, criticism, News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), May 27, 1986, at IA, col. I (reporting
efforts to rally support for proposal prior to start of legislative session); see also Blacks Still Pushing
to Change Runoffs, News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 14, 1986, at IA, col. 1 (reporting on
lobbying efforts during legislative session). The Democratic leadership in the general assembly ini-
tially supported the efforts to reduce the vote requirement, see Christensen, supra; however, the
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study examined the effects of the majority vote requirement in elections for the
general assembly, Congress, and statewide offices;95 however, this Note's analy-
sis is limited to the results of runoffs for Congress and statewide office because of
the difficulty in determining the race of candidates for other offices. In North
Carolina two black candidates for congressional or statewide office have been
involved in runoffs-H. M. (Mickey) Michaux, Second Congressional District,
and Howard Lee, lieutenant governor.96 In both instances the black candidate
won a plurality in the first primary, but lost to a white opponent in the runoff.97
The only other related runoff for major office in North Carolina occurred in
1984 when a female, Susan Green, lost the Democratic nomination for the Ninth
Congressional District in a runoff after winning a plurality in the initial pri-
mary.98 The North Carolina study also illustrates that the runoff allows racism
to prevail even in runoffs between white candidates. Frank Porter Graham, for-
mer president of the University of North Carolina who had been appointed to fill
a vacancy in the United States Senate, lost a runoff to Willis Smith in the 1950
Senate primary after winning more than forty-nine percent of the votes in the
initial primary.99 Graham, a renowned progressive, was hurt by his position on
civil rights in a campaign remembered for open appeals to racist sentiments. 10
Notwithstanding the studies discussed above, there is a lack of thorough
analysis in this area. No study has analyzed fully the disparate impact majority
vote requirements have on the political influence of blacks. This lack of analysis
only serves to perpetuate that disparate impact. An inability to prove disparate
impact or discriminatory effect makes it difficult to challenge such electoral
schemes successfully. Moreover, the lack of thorough analysis in this area en-
sures that the general public remains ignorant of the problem.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE MAJORITY
VOTE REQUIREMENT
The fifteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
part, that a citizen's right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
proposed change died in committee. See Christensen, Panel blocks move to change primary runoffs,
News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 20, 1986, at IA, col.L
95. See Lanier, supra note 78, at 20. Lanier indicates that between 1976 and 1982 no black or
female candidates for the North Carolina General Assembly lost in a runoff after winning 40% or
more of the initial primary votes. Id. at 22.
96. Lanier, supra note 78, at 22.
97. Lanier, supra note 78, at 22.
98. Interview with Mark Lanier (Nov. 27, 1985).
99. Lanier, supra note 78, at 22. Lanier reports that Smith won the runoff by only two percent
and that "in every county ... , voter turnout dropped." Id.
100. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986); Lanier, supra note 78, at 22. In another
study, Stella Theodoulou has analyzed the effect of Louisiana's open primary system, which includes
candidates from both parties in an initial primary followed by a runoff if no candidate achieves a
majority. See Theodoulou, supra note 2, at 459. However, Louisiana's open primary is sufficiently
different from other dual primaries to make this study inapplicable to the runoffs in existence
throughout the rest of South. Thus, Louisiana's unique method of election is beyond the scope of
this Note.
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tude."10 1 The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides, in part, that
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." 10 2 Because of the arguably disparate impact majority vote require-
ments have on blacks' political power, such requirements are open to attack
under both of these constitutional provisions. The purposes underlying majority
vote requirements took on additional importance after the Supreme Court's de-
cision in City of Mobile v. Bolden.103 In Bolden a plurality of the Court held that
electoral schemes violate the fifteenth or fourteenth amendments only if they
were "'conceived or operated'" for racially discriminatory purposes. 1 4
A. Overview
Before analyzing the majority vote requirement under the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments, it is necessary to review briefly the history of constitu-
tional voting rights litigation. In Baker v. Carr 105 the United States Supreme
Court first entered the "political thicket" 10 6 of voting rights claims involving a
practice other than outright denial of access to the polls. 10 7 In Baker the Court
held that a claim that Tennessee's refusal to reapportion its legislative districts to
reflect changes in the distribution of its population presented a justiciable claim
under the fourteenth amendment.10 8 In Reynolds v. Simms,10 9 decided two
years after Baker, the Supreme Court entrenched the principle of one person,
one vote-holding that apportionment of Alabama's legislature violated the
equal protection clause because population differences between districts gave in-
ordinate clout to the votes of those citizens in the smaller districts. 110 The prin-
ciple of vote dilution, central to modem voting rights litigation, thus emerged
from these decisions.
101. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
102. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV.
103. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
104. Id. at 70 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)).
105. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
106. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). In Colegrove the Court refused to decide
an apportionment issue because it presented a nonjusticiable political question. Id.
107. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Supreme Court held that the deliberate
redrawing of municipal boundaries to exclude black citizens violated the fifteenth amendment. The
decision in Gomillion foreshadowed the decision in Baker; however, Gomillion presented a claim of
complete denial of access to voting whereas Baker involved a claim that particular votes carried less
weight than others.
108. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
109. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
110. Id. at 565-68. Prior to Reynolds the Supreme Court, in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-
81 (1963), held that Georgia's method of counting votes violated the fourteenth amendment because
it weighted rural votes more heavily than urban votes. In Gray the Court said, "The conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote." Id. at 381. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964), the Supreme Court held that
Georgia's congressional districting scheme violated U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, which requires that
House members be elected "by the people of the several states." The Georgia scheme left some
voters represented by representatives responsible to fewer voters than representatives from other
districts; some votes thus carried less influence than other votes. In Reynolds the Supreme Court
made clear that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provided the source of the
"one person, one vote" principle. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66.
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In White v. Regester" 1 the Supreme Court analyzed at-large elections in
light of the vote dilution concept. In White minority voters from two legislative
districts in Texas contended that placing sizeable black and hispanic communi-
ties within white dominated, multimember districts overwhelmed the political
leverage of the minority communities. 1 2 Addressing these claims, the Court
announced that the constitutional inquiry concerned whether the "political
processes leading to nomination and election were.., equally open to participa-
tion by the group in question-that its members had... [equal] opportunity to
participate in the political process and to elect legislators of their choice."'1 13
The Supreme Court relied on a number of factors to hold that the particular
multimember districts in question diluted the vote of blacks in Dallas County
and hispanics in Bexar County.1 14 The Court approved the district court's find-
ing that a majority vote requirement and a numbered seat provision that led to
head-to-head confrontations "enhanced the opportunity for racial discrimina-
tion."' 115 Further, the Supreme Court recognized a "history of official racial
discrimination which at times in Texas touched the right of Negroes to register
and vote and to participate"'1 16 and noted that since Reconstruction only two
blacks from Dallas County had served in the state legislature. 117 The Court
thus approved findings of a lack of responsiveness on the part of white politi-
cians for the concerns of the black community and of a reliance on racial cam-
paign tactics. 18 The Court also approved the lower court's finding that blacks
had not been allowed to participate in the slating process selecting candidates for
the primaries. 19
With respect to the hispanic community in Bexar County, the Court
pointed to the "residual impact" of a history of discrimination in education,
employment, economics, health, and politics that contributed substantially to
low registration and low voter participation.1 20 The Court noted that only five
Mexican-Americans had been elected to the state legislature since 1880 and that
Bexar County's representatives were not responsive to the needs of the hispanic
community.' 2 1 Affirming the lower court's decree ordering the creation of sin-
gle-member districts, the Court added that the lower court's findings of past and
111. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
112. See id. at 756.
113. Id. at 766 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 150 (1971)).
114. Id. at 765. The factors approved by the Court included the following: Official discrimina-
tion affecting minority voting rights; existence of majority vote requirements in primaries and resi-
dency requirements in at-large elections; minorities' lack of electoral success; exclusion of minorities
from candidate-selecting organizations; white officials' failure to address the political concerns of
minority communities; the resort to racist appeals in political campaigns; and the residual impact of
societal discrimination on minorities. Id. at 766-69.
115. Id. at 766. The lower court had indicated that neither provision, standing alone, discrimi-
nated against blacks and hispanics. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 766-67.
118. Id. at 767.
119. Id. at 766-67.
120. Id. at 768-69.
121. Id.
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present discrimination were based on "the totality of the circumstances"--cau-
tioning that it did not establish a constitutional right to proportional representa-
tion. 122 The factors identified by the White court were further developed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen.123
Until 1980 lower courts124 relied on the Zimmer-White factors to hold that at-
large electoral systems, as operated in particular localities, violated both the
fourteenth amendment and the Voting Rights Act. 125
B. The Intent Requirement
In 1980 the Supreme Court in Bolden overturned a district court's invalida-
tion of Mobile, Alabama's method of electing its commissioners from the city at
large. 126 The lower court had based its decision on an analysis of the factors
developed in White and Zimmer. The lower court's analysis did not establish
that these circumstances proved discriminatory intent in either adopting or
maintaining the electoral system. 127 A plurality of the Court found that the
lower court had relied primarily on the lack of black elected officials and on the
commissioners' lack of concern for the needs of the black community. 128 The
plurality held that discriminatory intent was a necessary component of any vot-
ing rights claim-whether based on the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, or
the Voting Rights Act-and that plaintiffs had failed to establish the requisite
intent.1 29 The Court further noted that blacks in Mobile registered and voted
122. Id. at 769.
123. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School
Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). In Zimmer the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit carefully analyzed the "panoply of factors" relied on by the Supreme Court in
resolving vote dilution claims. Id. at 1305. The court then identified the circumstances and factors
to which minorities must point to support a vote dilution claim. In addition to an inability to elect
officials in proportion to their numbers in the population, the Zimmer court noted that minorities
must point to additional factors. The court noted that if minorities can point to
lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to
their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-
member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in general pre-
cludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case is made. Such proof
is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements,
anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running
from particular geographical subdistricts.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Zimmer court also noted that a vote dilution claim could be maintained
without proof of all of the factors. Id.
124. See, eg., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 238
(5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
126. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 55.
127. Id. at 71.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 65-70. The Bolden Court noted that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act "adds nothing to
the appellees' [black voters in Mobile, Alabama] complaint." Id. at 60.
A seriously divided Supreme Court decided Bolden. Justice Blackmun agreed with the result,
finding that the district court's decree ordering Mobile to switch from a commission form of govern-
ment to a mayor-council system raised substantial constitutional questions. Id. at 81 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in result). Justice Blackmun left open the question whether a vote dilution claim re-
quired proof of purposeful discrimination, but he indicated that the lower court's findings supported
an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in result).
Justice Stevens approved the rejection of the Zimmer analysis, but disagreed with the plurality's
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without hindrance.1 30 The Bolden plurality stated that discrimination in em-
ployment and in providing public services did not relate to voting and that a
history of racial discrimination was of limited help in proving present discrimi-
natory intent. 131 The Court added that although the majority vote requirement
"[disadvantaged] any voting minority," its existence did not prove "purposeful
discrimination."1 32 As it did in its earlier White decision, the Court emphasized
that no political groups were entitled to proportional representation.
133
In Rogers v. Lodge 134 the Supreme Court softened the implications of
Bolden by approving a district court's finding that an at-large electoral sys-
tem,135 combined with a majority vote requirement and anti-single-shot provi-
sions,1 36 had been maintained for discriminatory purposes. 137 The lower court
relied on the White-Zimmer factors to find that Burke County, Georgia, had
maintained its method of electing county commissioners for discriminatory pur-
poses. 138 Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented, noting that the lower court
based its conclusions on the same factors considered inadequate in Bolden.139
focus on the subjective intent of the lawmakers. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Justice Stevens argued that the inquiry should concern "the objective effects of the political deci-
sion." Id. Justice Stevens suggested that only those election laws with a substantial "adverse im-
pact" on political groups and without "any legitimate justification" violated the Constitution. Id. at
90-92 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Justice White found that the evidence supported an inference of purposeful discrimination. Id.
at 99 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall characterized the plurality opinion as holding that
absent proof of discriminatory intent, "the right to vote provides the politically powerless with noth-
ing more than the right to cast meaningless ballots." Id. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall stated that "[w]hatever may be the merits of applying motivational analysis to the alloca-
tion of constitutionally gratuitous benefits [such as jobs], that approach is completely misplaced
where, as here, it is applied to the distribution of a constitutionally protected interest." Id. at 121
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also argued that disparate impact on racial minorities
was sufficient to invalidate election laws under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, as well as
the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined the dissenting
opinions of both Justice White and Justice Marshall. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 73.
131. Id. at 73-74.
132. Id. at 74.
133. Id. at 79-80.
134. 458 U.S. 613, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 899 (1982).
135. Under an at-large electoral scheme voters elect officials from the political unit as a whole
rather than from districts within the political unit. See id. at 616. The Rogers Court identified the
potential discriminatory impact of such an electoral system:
At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength of
minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect ali representatives of the dis-
trict. A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political group, may
be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election, yet may be able to elect sev-
eral representatives if the political unit is divided into single-member districts.
Id. I /
136. Minorities may offset the dilutive effect of at-large elections by voting for only a few of the
seats up for election to avoid providing the winning margin for less favored candidates. Such efforts
are referred to as single-shot voting. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183-84 & n.19
(1980) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER
206-07 (1975)). Anti-single-shot provisions appear in different forms. However, they all share an
essential feature-they all require voters to vote separately for each seat up for election. See id. at
185 & n.21 (discussing operation of numbered posts, residency requirements, and staggered terms).
137. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 627.
138. Id. at 620-22.
139. Id. at 628 (Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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C. Discriminatory Intent in Adoption
Proof of purposeful discrimination in the adoption of second primaries
presents an elusive target. Until recently historians simply have not investigated
specifically the motivations underlying the creation of majority vote require-
ments. 140 Further, detailed legislative history is either unavailable or inconclu-
sive. 1 4 1 Professor Kousser reports that newspapers of the times focused on the
general principles of primaries, but not specifically on the majority vote require-
ment. 142 He adds, however, that proponents of the primary emphasized the
complementary goals of strengthening the Democratic party and "[shifting] con-
trol toward 'the people'-loyal white Democrats."1 43 These objectives support
the argument that the purpose behind the majority vote requirement was to stifle
black political influence.
Although direct proof of intentional discrimination in the development of
majority vote requirements has been difficult to uncover, strong circumstantial
evidence does exist. This evidence is illustrated by examining when and where
runoffs first appeared. Professor Kousser has noted that the states with the larg-
est black populations were the first to use second primaries. 144 In South Caro-
lina the dual primary emerged within a year of South Carolina's
disenfranchising convention.145 Similarly, Alabama Democrats implemented a
primary runoff provision in 1902-one year after a new constitution, which dis-
enfranchised blacks, was enacted. 146
Runoff statutes in some states allow municipalities to decide whether to
require a majority vote for nomination in local elections. 147 Since the passage of
140. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394.
141. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394.
142. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394.
143. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394.
144. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394.
145. Kousser, supra note 9, at 394; Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (testimony of James Clyburn,
Comm'r, S.C. Human Affairs Comm'n).
146. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-31, (1985); C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at
372. The history behind Alabama's majority vote requirement provides circumstantial evidence of a
discriminatory intent underlying its adoption. In Hunter the Supreme Court upheld the invalidation
of a provision in Alabama's Constitution that disenfranchised individuals convicted of crimes be-
lieved by the framers of the Constitution to be most often committed by blacks. The Supreme Court
approved the lower court's findings that the provision was adopted for discriminatory purposes dur-
ing Alabama's 1901 Constitutional Convention, convened to disenfranchise blacks. Hunter, 471
U.S. at 228-29. Alabama sought to justify the 1901 provision by arguing that the measure was
designed to exclude "poor whites as well as blacks." Id. at 230. The Court explained the argument
as follows: "The Southern Democrats... sought in this way to stem the resurgence of Populism
which threatened their power ...." Id. Although the Supreme Court reached no conclusions
concerning the validity of the historical argument, the Court did find that the argument conceded
that the provision in question would not have been adopted but for "racially discriminatory motiva-
tion." Id. at 231. The Hunter Court's opinion thus suggests that the historical evidence necessary to
support a constitutional attack on Alabama's majority vote requirement may already exist.
147. See Butler, The Majority Vote Requirement: The Case Against its Wholesale Elimination, 17
URB. LAW. 441, 446 (1985); see also McDonald, supra note 6, at 429, 433 (citing the city of Ameri-
cus, Georgia, which implemented a majority vote requirement after a sharp increase in black voter
registration).
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the Voting Rights Act, 148 a number of local governments have attempted to
switch from plurality rules to majority vote requirements.' 49 Because such a
change would be discussed publicly, evidence of intentional discrimination prob-
ably would be easier to develop in such a situation. Most areas within states
requiring runoffs, however, are covered by section five of the Voting Rights Act,
which mandates that all changes in election laws be screened by either the Jus-
tice Department or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
for retrogressive effects on minorities' voting rights. 150 To date this preclearance
provision has obviated the need for constitutional attacks on second primaries
enacted by municipalities; between 1975 and 1980 the Justice Department re-
jected sixty-six attempts to establish majority vote requirements.15'
D. Maintained for Discriminatory Purposes
Even if sufficient support for a claim of purposeful discrimination in the
promulgation of a particular runoff cannot be uncovered, convincing evidence of
a discriminatory intent in maintaining dual primaries would support a constitu-
tional challenge.' 5 2 However, not only is it difficult to ascertain the motivation
behind legislative action, it is also difficult to establish the motivation behind
legislative inaction. Nevertheless, the arguments of the proponents of second
primaries support a contention that racial bias motivates the maintenance of
dual primaries.
Supporters of majority vote requirements contend that runoffs ensure that a
party's nominee has broad support within the party.' 53 Because minority
groups, by definition, make up less than a majority in most electoral districts,
this justification amounts to a statutory requirement that minority candidates
148. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973a-p (1982)).
149. McDonald, supra note 6, at 433 (providing examples of two Georgia cities that changed to
majority vote requirements with "predictable" discriminatory results).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). Section five of the Voting Rights Act provides, in part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision... to which the prohibitions set forth in... this
title [apply] ... shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in
force or effect on [November 1, 1964, 1968, or 1972, depending on which prohibitions
apply to the State], such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualifica-
tion, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color ....
and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to
vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or pro-
cedure: Provided, ,That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
may be enforced without such proceeding if [it] has been submitted... to the Attorney
General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after
such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within
sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that
such objection will not be made.
Id.
151. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 69(1981).
152. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623-27.
153. See Roberts, supra note 1.
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receive a certain number of white votes. The number of white votes received by
a minority candidate depends on the extent of racially polarized voting. In the
context of the racial bloc voting prevailing in the states requiring runoffs,1 54 the
second primary all but guarantees that no minority will ever be elected to any
office representing a predominantly white constituency.
In Butts v. City of New York 15 5 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York recognized the racial bias inherent in the posi-
tion that runoffs fulfill the "necessary" function of providing that a party's nomi-
nee can attract a majority of the votes cast in a primary. 156 In Butts the district
court held that New York City's rule setting a forty percent threshold for nomi-
nation in citywide elections violated both the fourteenth amendment and section
two of the Voting Rights Act. 157 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, however, disagreed with the district court and found that the
New York City forty percent requirement violated neither the Constitution nor
the Voting Rights Act.' 58 Even had it not been reversed, the district court's
constitutional holding, based on legislative intent in adopting the forty percent
rule, would be of limited relevance to most runoffs in the South because New
York's statute had been enacted in 1972.159 The court, however, did analyze
154. See City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982) (discussing racial bloc
voting in Texas); Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623 (discussing racial bloc voting in Georgia); Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 354. 367 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (discussing racial bloc voting in North Carolina),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
155. 614 F. Supp. 1527 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
3335 (1986).
156. Id. at 1553.
157. Id. at 1548. Section two of the Voting Rights Act provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State ... in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen... to vote on account of race or color ....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State... are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State ... is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That noth-
ing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in num-
bers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
158. Butts, 779 F.2d at 143.
159. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1528. "[A]n unprecedented showing by a Hispanic candidate for
mayor," Herman Badillo, sparked New York City's superplurality rule. Id. at 1547. The bill was
"known in Albany legislative circles as the 'Badillo bill,' or perhaps more properly the 'anti-Badillo
bill.'" Id. at 1530. Sponsors of the statute sidestepped charges that the law would'prevent minority
candidates from winning citywide elections in New York City and focused instead on the need to
reduce the possibility of candidates winning pluralities without the support of a majority of the party
members. Id. at 1553. The court rejected this justification, noting that, in the context of racial bloc
voting, devices intended to strengthen majority influence are designed to reduce minority power. Id.
at 1553. The court also rested its decision on the fact the threshold level of 40% was significantly
higher than the percentage of minority voters in New York City and higher than the highest percent-
age won by a minority candidate in a citywide race. Id. at 1554.
In North Carolina Ken Spaulding introduced a bill that would have amended North Carolina's
majority vote requirement to a rule mandating only 40% of the initial primary votes for nomination.
Lanier, supra note 78, at 19. Opponents of the bill, much like the antagonists of the New York
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certain arguments advanced by supporters of the second primary that are similar
to those relied on by southern Democrats. The district court's analysis of these
arguments remains relevant despite the ultimate outcome of the case. One of the
sponsors of the New York statute had argued that without the forty percent
minimum "'individuals would prevail in these primary contests who are not
truly representative of the majority of the members of a particular party.' -16
Addressing this contention, the court pointed out that it was merely
another way of saying that.., the voting power of the minority would
be diluted, for the power of a majority cannot be enhanced without
taking away from that of a minority, and that minority might likely be
racial or ethnic, rather than of a specific philosophical bent .... As
polarized voting increases this likelihood becomes greater. 161
James Clyburn has characterized this justification for majority vote require-
ments as follows: "'[W]hite people are in the majority and.., are supposed to
rule.' "162
Supporters of the runoff argue that its elimination would strengthen the
Republican party in the South. Bill Youngblood, chairman of the South Caro-
lina Democratic party, has said that abolishing the majority vote requirement
would "'hand the Republicans on a silver platter something we don't have now
in our state-a grassroots organization.' "163 Congressman Ed Jenkins of Geor-
gia has estimated that allowing nomination by plurality would allow the election
in Georgia of" 'between fifteen and twenty-five Republicans and only a couple
or three blacks.' "164 Bert Lance, Georgia Democratic chairman, has agreed,
arguing that "'[dropping the second primary] would [only] help elect Republi-
cans at every level.' "165 These contentions assume that eliminating the runoff
would increase black nominations, which would in turn lead to defection by
white Democrats. An apparent willingness to sacrifice black candidacies for the
sake of maintaining the Democratic status quo clearly lurks beneath these justifi-
cations. Similarly, these arguments suggest great reluctance on the part of the
southern Democratic establishment to commit its political support and financial
backing to black nominees.
In the final analysis, however, an effective constitutional assault on dual
primaries based on discriminatory intent in maintaining a majority vote require-
ment would rest on the type of circumstantial evidence identified in White and
Zimmer.166 A strong showing of the White-Zimmer factors, combined with
statute, "privately... [referred] to the Spaulding proposal as the 'Michaux' bill." Id. at 22. The
difficulty of proving such allegations against a sufficient number of legislators highlights the
problems inherent in an intent requirement. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 104-141 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
160. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1553 (quoting State Senator Bloom).
161. Id.
162. Hearings, supra note 3, at 108 (quoting from a panel discussion on the impact of primary
runoffs on minority political influence).
163. Galley, Runoff Issue Puts Democrats on Spot, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1984, at B13, col. 4
(quoting Bill Youngblood).
164. Roberts, supra note 1 (quoting Ed Jenkins).
165. Gailey, supra note 163 (quoting Bert Lance).
166. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 621-22.
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careful analysis demonstrating their operation on the runoff to produce discrimi-
natory results, would allow an inference that the legislators maintained the sec-
ond primary for the purpose of diluting the votes of minorities. 167
IV. CHALLENGES UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Although majority vote requirements and primary runoffs are subject to
constitutional challenges, such challenges are likely to fail. The Supreme
Court's holding in Bolden established that such election schemes will fail only if
it can be proved that they were enacted, or are maintained, with discriminatory
intent. As discussed previously, proof of such discriminatory intent will be diffi-
cult to establish. Because the Voting Rights Act prohibits discriminatory effects
irrespective of discriminatory intent, litigation attacking majority vote require-
ments and primary runoffs should focus on section two of the Voting Rights
Act. 168
In 1982 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act "to make clear that proof
of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section
Two."' 169 The Senate Report accompanying the amendment criticized the
Supreme Court's decision in Bolden for "[placing] an unacceptably difficult bur-
den on plaintiffs" and for "[diverting] the judicial inquiry from the crucial ques-
tion of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral process to a
historical question of individual motives."170 Congress explicitly outlawed elec-
toral schemes that disadvantage minorities and established "the legal standards
... by codifying White v. Regester."' 71
The Senate Report identifies those factors to be considered in determining
whether minorities "have an equal opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice."' 172 The Senate Report pro-
vides that:
Typical factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the mi-
nority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the dem-
ocratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusally large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single
167. Id.
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). For the language of § 2, see supra note 157.
169. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177, 179; see Act of June 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973).
170. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177, 193.
171. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 193.
172. Id. at 28, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 206.
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shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may en-
hance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to par-
ticipate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as
part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the mi-
nority group;
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice or procedure is tenuous. 173
The Senate Report makes clear that the enumeration of factors is not exhaustive
and that no particular number or combination of factors must be shown to es-
tablish a violation of the Voting Rights Act. 174
In Thornburg v. Gingles,175 a case decided in 1986, the Supreme Court ap-
plied the 1982 amendment to section two of the Voting Rights Act for the first
time. 176 The Court noted, "The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral
law, practice or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect
their preferred representatives."' 177 Although the Court recognized the rele-
vance of all the factors enunciated in the Senate Report, 178 it identified racial
bloc voting and the extent of minority representation as the critical factors to be
considered. 17 9 The Court held that to challenge a multimember district success-
fully, minority voters had to establish that "a bloc voting majority must usually
be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically
insular minority group."' 180
The Supreme Court, however, carefully limited its interpretation of section
two to claims that particular at-large electoral schemes impaired minority vot-
173. Id. at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 206-07 (footnotes
omitted).
174. Id. at 29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 207.
175. 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
176. Id. at 2758.
177. Id. at 2764-65.
178. Id. at 2765- 66 & n. 15. The Court noted, "If present, the other factors.., are supportive of,
but not essential to, a minority voter's claim." Id. at 2766 n.15.
179. Id. at 2765-66 & n.15.
180. Id. at 2766.
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ers' ability to elect their chosen candidates. 181 This qualification is important
because whether minorities are geographically cohesive has little bearing on
whether a specific majority vote requirement unduly enhances the potential for
discrimination existing within the voting unit. In the context of a multimember
districting scheme, unless minority voters are concentrated in sufficient numbers
to allow a single-member district to be drawn for their advantage, the at-large
system cannot be blamed for minorities' inability to elect candidates.18 2 On the
other hand, second primaries may operate in a specific setting to accentuate the
voting strength of majorities impermissibly-at the expense of minorities' electo-
ral influence-even if the electoral unit is substantially integrated.
In Butts the district court assessed New York City's forty percent require-
ment in light of the factors articulated in the Senate Report. 183 The court found
the following: a history of discrimination in voting; racially polarized voting;
lingering effects of discrimination in education, employment, and health-re-
flected in lower socio-economic status-that meant that the potential necessity
of winning two primaries rather than one bore more heavily on minority candi-
dates; racial appeals in political campaigns; the absence of victories by blacks or
hispanics in citywide campaigns; and a tenuous state policy-preventing nomi-
nation of minority candidates. 184 Based on these findings the court held that
under the totality of the circumstances the New York statute had a disparate
impact on minority voters and therefore violated section two of the Voting
Rights Act. 185 The court carefully noted that it harbored no misconceptions
concerning the existence of a right to proportional representation. 186
Because the district court's holding in Butts was later reversed, it offers
little direct support for challenges to majority vote requirements in the South.
However, the district court's analysis and reasoning should assist parties in de-
181. Id. at 2764-65 n.12. The Court did not consider whether § 2 applies to challenges based on
an inability to influence, contrasted with determining the outcome of an election. Id. The Court
also emphasized that it did not decide the standard to be applied to other types of electoral practices
or procedures. Id.
182. Id. at 2766-67. The Court offered the following explanation: "Unless minority voters pos-
sess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they
cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice." Id. In a multimember district
minorities either have or lack the potential to elect candidates of their choice from single-member
districts carved from the larger unit. See id. The situation differs when minorities are diffused
evenly throughout the electoral unit. Under such circumstances minorities' potential political influ-
ence exists along a continuum and depends on the percentage of minority voters, the extent of bloc
voting, as well as the operation of various electoral schemes. In different settings minorities may
have more or less political influence, but it cannot be said that they either have or lack electoral
power merely because they live in an integrated area.
183. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1542-48.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1548. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the district
court's finding that the New York law violated the Voting Rights Act. The court of appeals first
conceded that "i]t is possible that the run-off law may make it harder for the preferred candidate of
a racial minority... to win a party's nomination .... Butts, 779 F.2d at 149. The court noted
further, however, that the Voting Rights Act "is concerned with the dilution of minority participa-
tion and not the difficulty of minority victory." Id. Although noting that it was unnecessary for it to
do so, the court of appeals also considered, and rejected, the district court's application of the factors
contained in the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 150-51.
186. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1548.
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veloping such challenges-despite the subsequent reversal. A fifty percent hur-
dle, as imposed by most southern runoff statutes, obviously submerges minority
voting strength more effectively than a forty percent threshold. More impor-
tantly, the district court in Butts found that the New York statute operated with
discriminatory results despite the fact no minority candidate had ever won a
plurality in the initial primary only to lose in the runoff.187 In the South, how-
ever, many minorities have been defeated in runoffs against white opponents
who finished second in the initial primary.188
In general, strong evidence of official discrimination touching the right to
vote should exist in any state that requires a majority vote for nomination. 8 9 In
Rogers the Supreme Court recognized that past discrimination in voting contrib-
utes to the present low rates of minority voter registration.19 0 Even after sub-
stantial success in registering blacks during the 1984 elections, the rate of black
registration in the South is still ten percent less than that of white registra-
tion.19 1 In Butts the court found that New York's superplurality rule enhanced
the effect of lower rates of registration attributed to official discrimination in
voting. 192 Lower rates of minority registration require minority candidates to
win higher percentages of white votes. In the context of the racially polarized
voting common in the South, 193 lower rates of registration among blacks
heighten the discriminatory impact of second primaries.
Moreover, racial bloc voting persists throughout those states that require
runoffs. 194 The presence and strength of this factor are at the heart of those
claims that runoffs dilute the votes of minorities. When white voters consist-
ently refuse to support black candidates, the majority vote requirement guaran-
tees that no minority will ever win nomination.
Although Butts is the first decision to consider a direct challenge to a runoff
provision,195 many courts have recognized that majority vote requirements en-
187. See id. at 1529. The court of appeals, however, was not willing to ignore this fact. The
court noted that "the bill has not yet had any negative effect on a minority candidate; indeed, it is
not at all clear which way the law will cut-it may help a minority candidate to win nomination."
Butts, 779 F.2d at 149.
188. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 73-80.
189. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624; White, 412 U.S. at 766; Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1301; Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub non Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
190. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624.
191. Hearings, supra note 3, at 135 (testimony of Lani Guinier, Assistant Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.).
192. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1544-45. The court of appeals, however, rejected the district court's
findings with respect to past discrimination in voting rights on the part of New York. Rather, the
court noted that "New York has ensured to black citizens the right to vote on the same terms as
whites since 1824 [and that the city had] taken affirmative steps since 1975 to encourage minority
voting .... " Butts, 779 F.2d at 150.
193. See City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982); Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623;
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 354, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub norm.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
194. See City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982); Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623;
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 354, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
195. But see Bond v. Fortson, 334 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 930 (1971) (dis-
missing challenge to Georgia's majority vote requirement for lack of case or controversy). The
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hance the impact of racially polarized voting. In City of Port Arthur v. United
States 196 the Supreme Court approved a lower court order that conditioned its
approval of a plan creating a combination of at-large and single-member districts
for city council elections on elimination of a majority vote requirement for the
at-large seats. 1 9 7 The Supreme Court stated:
As the District Court well understood, the majority-vote rule . . .
would always require the black candidate in an at-large election, if he
survived the initial round, to run against one white candidate. In the
context of racial bloc voting prevalent in Port Arthur, the rule would
permanently foreclose a black candidate from being elected to an at-
large seat. 198
In Gingles v. Edmisten 199 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of North Carolina noted that majority vote requirements reduce the likeli-
hood that any candidate representing "identifiable voting [minorities]" would
win.2°° The court then stated: "This generally adverse effect on any cohesive
voting minority is... enhanced for racial minority groups if... racial polariza-
tion in voting patterns also exists." '20 1
The Senate Report lists the majority vote requirement as one of several
"voting practices.., that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination. '20 2
The operation of second primaries in combination with the other procedures
enumerated-unusually large election districts and anti-single-shot provi-
sions2 0 3-adds to the discriminatory impact of runoffs. Although voting rights
litigation and preclearance review have reduced the use of these devices, large
districts and anti-single-shot devices still exist in many parts of the South.2°4
Exclusion of minorities from candidate slating processes accentuates the
discriminatory results of dual primaries. 20 5 Without the active support of the
decision in Bond is best explained by the failure of plaintiffs to make adequate offers of proof. Plain-
tiffs in Bond relied solely on Georgia's history of racial discrimination, congressional findings of
continuing voting discrimination, the date of the runoff statute-1964, and the "patently" discrimi-
natory effects of runoffs in making their case. Id. at 1193. Plaintiffs failed to offer evidence support-
ing these conclusions, nor did they even allege discriminatory impact. Id. at 1194. In Jackson v.
Allain, No. GC 84-42-LS-0 (N.D. Miss.), plaintiffs challenged Mississippi's runoff provision. See
McDonald, supra note 6, at 435 & n.30. The case, however, never went to trial-court records show
the case closed as of August 28, 1986. Telephone conversation with the Clerk of Court's office,
United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (Nov. 10, 1986).
196. 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
197. Id. at 167.
198. Id.; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183-84 (1980) (court approved the
adoption of a similar condition before approval of an electoral plan).
199. 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rep'd in part sub nom. Thornburg v.
Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
200. Id. at 363.
201. Id.
202. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177, 206.
203. Id.
204. See City ofPort Arthur, 459 U.S. at 162; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 188
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); White, 412 U.S. at 762; Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 350; U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 151, at 69.
205. The term "candidate slating" refers to endorsements by influential political organizations.
See White, 412 U.S. at 766-67 & n.11. Given the prevalance of racial bloc voting, see supra text
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white political establishment, few inroads against racial bloc voting can be ex-
pected. The majority vote requirement forces minority candidates to attract
substantial percentages of white votes to win nomination. Thus, denying minor-
ity candidates access to slating procedures places another group of potential vot-
ers beyond the reach of black and hispanic politicians. It is conceivable that in
some districts the number of voters who rely on endorsements by slating organi-
zations, when combined with the number of white voters who simply refuse to
vote for any minority candidate, is so high that a majority vote requirement is all
that is required to lock minorities out of political office.
Minorities in the South have also been relegated to a lower socio-economic
status as a result of years of open, hostile, and state-sponsored racism. In Rogers
the Supreme Court upheld findings that black citizens in Burke County, Geor-
gia, earned lower incomes, worked in less favorable jobs, lived in poorer housing,
and received less education than their white peers.206 The Court noted that this
"depressed socio-economic status" reflected "the lingering effects of past dis-
crimination. °207 In Gingles the district court made extensive findings regarding
the present effects of a history of North Carolina discrimination "in public and
private facility uses, education, employment, housing and health care."208
These socio-economic consequences hinder political participation, and the
runoff doubles the discriminatory impact. In Gingles the district court found
that "[t]his lower socio-economic status gives rise to special group interests"
and "operates to hinder the group's ability to participate effectively in the polit-
ical process and to elect representatives of its choice as a means of seeking gov-
ernment's awareness of and attention to those interests. °20 9 The key problem
associated with this generally lower status, as it relates to the runoff, lies in the
fact black candidates have fewer economic resources to draw on.210 The dual
primary forces candidates to finance two primary campaigns, and black candi-
dates must rely primarily on a poorer segment of the population to finance those
campaigns. Basil Paterson, a black politician in New York who has served as a
state senator, Deputy Mayor of New York City, and Secretary of State of New
York has estimated that an additional 500,000 dollars is necessary for a success-
ful runoff campaign for a citywide office in New York City.211 In Butts the
district court found that the "burdens associated with campaigning and winning
in two primaries instead of one are likely to have a disproportionately unfair
impact on minority voters .... ,212
accompanying notes 193-94, and the fact blacks form a majority in few political units, see infra text
accompanying notes 3 10-11, the exclusion of blacks from the endorsement process by influential
groups among white voters may make it impossible for black candidates to overcome majority vote
requirements in certain voting districts.
206. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626-27.
207. Id. (noting the findings of the district court).
208. Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 360-63.
209. Id. at 365.
210. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 31 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights) (discussing additional problems faced by candidates with limited resources).
211. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1536.
212. Id. at 1548. The court of appeals apparently accepted this contention; however, the court
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In the South additional logistical problems are created by the depressed
socio- economic status of minorities. Lani Guinier, a civil rights attorney for the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense
Fund, has noted that much of the South consists of "large rural counties with no
public transportation, [that] one-third of the black households have no access to
a car, truck or van, [and that] one-fourth of the black households have no tele-
phone .... ,,213 Registration and polling sites are often located far away from
black communities.2 14 Past discrimination in education means that higher per-
centages of black voters need assistance in voting.2 15 The dual primary system
doubles the burden of getting black voters to the polls and aiding undereducated
voters. 2 16 These considerations not only cause the second primary to weigh
more heavily on minorities, but they often discourage black candidates from
running for political office. 217 Moreover, these circumstances intensify the im-
pact of the generally lower voting patterns of members of lower socio- economic
classes who are disproportionately minorities. 218
Racist campaign tactics, another factor identified by the Senate Report,
continue to plague southern politics.2 19 Although racial appeals themselves
"lessen . . . the opportunity of black citizens to participate effectively in the
political processes and to elect candidates of their choice,"1220 head-to-head con-
frontations between black and white candidates in runoffs arguably enhance the
effectiveness of such tactics. 22 ' Herman Badillo, testifying in Butts, noted that it
is difficult to predict the effect of appeals to racism in multicandidate fields.222
Arguably, the use of racist campaign tactics hurts both the black candidate and
the candidate relying on such ploys. In relatively short runoff campaigns black
candidates often do not have time to hold white opponents accountable for au-
thorizing blatantly racist campaign materials. 223 Racial campaigns heighten ra-
rejected the notion that this fact supported a finding that the New York law violated the Voting
Rights Act. The court noted:
The district court suggested that the added expense of a run-off would inevitably hurt
minority candidates, who have more difficulty raising campaign funds. We note, however,
that the run-off in the 1977 primary for City Council President allowed Carol Bellamy-
who seemed something of an "outsider" at the time-to overtake incumbent Paul
O'Dwyer.
Butts, 779 F.2d at 150.
213. Hearings, supra note 3, at 136 (testimony of Lani Guinier, Assistant Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.) (testifying on registration barriers).
214. Hearings, supra note 3, at 136 (testimony of Lani Guinier, Assistant Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.) (testifying on registration barriers).
215. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 47 (testimony of Victor MeTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
216. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 47 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
217. See Guinier, The Runoff Primary: Threat to Our Rights, ESSENCE, July 1984, at 16.
218. See Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1548.
219. See White, 412 U.S. at 767; Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 364.
220. Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 364.
221. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1545.
222. Id. at 1532.
223. Id. at 1531-32. The court of appeals in Butts found there was no evidence of racist appeals
in prior New York City elections. Butts, 779 F.2d at 150.
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cially polarized voting, and the dual primary system enhances the
discriminatory impact of both.
The Voting Rights Act establishes also that lack of electoral success is a
relevant circumstance in assessing the operation of electoral schemes. 224 At the
1984 Democratic Convention the Reverend Jesse Jackson remarked: "Nineteen
years [after passage of the Voting Rights Act] we're locked out [of] the Con-
gress, the Senate, and the Governor's mansion. '225 The majority of states with
runoff provisions have not elected blacks to Congress since Reconstruction. 226
Texas and Georgia currently are the only states that require a majority vote for
nomination which are represented in Congress by a black person. 227 In con-
trast, Virginia, a state that nominates by caucuses instead of primaries, recently
elected the South's first black lieutenant governor.22 8 Of course, the Voting
Rights Act expressly provides that it does not establish a right to proportional
representation. 229 In Rogers, however, the Supreme Court recognized that
"[b]ecause it is sensible to expect that at least some blacks would have been
elected in Burke County, the fact that none have ever been elected is important
evidence of purposeful exclusion."'230 Furthermore, it is clear that the lack of
black political representation in the South results, at least in part, from the ra-
cism that pervades the entire United States. Moreover, the very existence of
dual primaries may deter black candidacies. 231 The lack of political representa-
tion by black citizens illustrates that the runoff dilutes black political power;
second primaries are an essential component of the obstacles keeping blacks out
of political office in the South.
In many parts of the South, minority voters may be able to establish that
white elected officials consistently ignore the particularized needs of minority
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
225. Excerpts from Jackson Appeal to Convention Delegates for Unity in Party, N.Y. Times, July
18, 1984, at A18, col. 4 [hereinafter Jackson] (speech presented July 17, 1984).
226. Among the states that require runoffs, the author has found only two states-Georgia and
Texas-that have elected blacks to Congress in modem times. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 44
(testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional Rights); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 151, at 89; Stekler, Electing Blacks to Office in the South-Black Candidate, Bloc Voting
and Racial Unity Twenty Years After the Voting Rights Act, 17 URB. LAw. 473, 475-78 (1985); see
also M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, supra note 37 (containing biographical information on elected offi-
cials from the various states and demographical data on the states and congressional districts; pub-
lished annually).
227. See generally M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, supra note 37 (containing biographical informa-
tion on elected officials from the various states and demographical data on the states and congres-
sional districts; published annually). On November 4, 1986, John Lewis, a black, won election in the
Fifth Congressional District of Georgia. See Lin, Blacks Key to Fowler victory, takeover of Senate by
Democrats, leaders say, Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 7, 1986, at 9A, col. I (noting Lewis' victory); see
also Thurston & Secrest, Candidates in Congressional races keep campaign trail hot on last day,
Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 4, 1986, at 23A, col. 1 (discussing the final day of Lewis' campaign, and
noting his bitter battle with Julian Bond-also a black-in the Democratic primary).
228. Epps, Can Virginia Really Teach Us How to be Progressive?, N.C. Independent, Nov. 22-
Dec. 5, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
229. 42 U.S.C. 1973b (1982).
230. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623-24.
231. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 30-31 (tesitmony of Victor McTeer, Center of Constitutional
Rights) (testifying that because of anticipated discriminatory result of a runoff, James Meredith
dropped out of a race for congressional seat in Mississippi after winning a plurality in opening pri-
mary; discussing additional financial and logistical burdens associated with dual primaries).
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communities. Such a lack of responsiveness to the needs of minorities is another
factor identified by the Senate Report. In Rogers plaintiffs were able to establish
discriminatory road paving, desegregation of schools and grand juries only after
successful litigation, and public support of private schools. 232 The Supreme
Court approved reliance on these circumstances to prove purposeful discrimina-
tion in maintaining an at-large electoral system.2 33 Strong evidence of a lack of
responsiveness to minority concerns demonstrates that the political influence of
minorities has been diluted so effectively that elected officials can overlook their
needs without fear of political repercussion; majority vote requirements help
provide such a sense of security. It is at the local level that such a lack of re-
sponsiveness can most easily be established. Proof of indifference towards the
political interests of minorities would be easier to develop in municipalities than
in congressional districts or statewide offices; disparate distribution of govern-
mental services-typically provided by local governments-is more susceptible
of proof than indifference of congressmen or state officials to minority concerns.
In sum, convincing evidence of most, if not all, of the factors developed in
White and Zimmer and enacted by Congress in the Voting Rights Act should be
available in every state that operates dual primaries. These circumstances create
the conditions for the discriminatory results of majority vote requirements. In
turn, the runoff enhances the racially disparate impact of these factors on minor-
ity voting rights. Under the totality of circumstances existing in each state that
holds second primaries, the majority vote requirement arguably denies minori-
ties "an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect
candidates of their choice." 234
Moreover, the fundamental justification for maintaining majority vote re-
quirements appears to rest on the alleged necessity of nominating candidates
who have received a majority of the primary votes of party members.235 In
Butts the district court found this a tenuous state policy because racial bloc vot-
ing resulted in ensuring majority support only at the expense of minority polit-
ical power, and because preserving the power of the Democratic establishment
was an improper subject for state legislation.236
The above discussion suggests that challenges to majority vote requirements
can be brought successfully under the Voting Rights Act. However, the Second
Circuit's holding in Butts suggests that even this avenue of attack presents seri-
ous obstacles to those who might seek to challenge majority vote requirements.
232. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626.
233. Id.
234. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177, 206.
235. See Roberts, supra note 1.
236. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1547-48. The court of appeals rejected the district court's finding of
a tenuous state policy. The court first noted that it had rejected the district court's finding that the
New York law was enacted with a discriminatory intent. Butts, 779 F.2d at 151. The court then
reasoned that its finding cast serious doubt "as to the district court's finding of tenuous state policy."
Id. The court of appeals also noted that the New York law "was enacted with the motive of improv-
ing the workings of the party system in New York ...." Id.
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V. PRIMARY RUNOFFS AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Apart from questions surrounding legal challenges to second primaries, a
number of questions arise concerning the political expediency of eliminating ma-
jority vote requirements. These questions center around the stability of the
traditional coalition between white and black Democrats and the ability of black
Democrats to win general elections after being nominated with less than a ma-
jority of the primary votes. Additional factors for consideration include the ef-
fect of eliminating runoffs in majority black election districts, as well as the
ability of white politicians to join forces to avoid splitting the vote to the advan-
tage of black candidates.
A. Blacks and Political Affiliation
As black citizens in the South regained the right to vote, most supported
the Democratic party.2 37 The Democratic agenda appeared more attractive to
blacks, and until relatively recently, the Democratic party provided the only
path to political power in the South.238 Southern Democrats' strength now de-
pends largely on blacks and rural whites.2 39 In turn, the residual effect of the
South's one-party status leads many white Democrats to support the Demo-
cratic party in name and the Republican party in spirit.24° As a result, the Re-
publican party has done well in the South in recent presidential elections and
enjoys southern support on national issues; at the same time, the Democratic
establishment has managed to retain its power base by "[straddling] the racial
fence" on divisive issues.24 1
Supporters of primary runoffs argue that the majority vote requirement en-
courages coalitions between white and black Democrats because candidates real-
ize that eventually they will have to put together fifty percent of the primary
vote to win nomination.242 Many southern Democrats consequently fear that
eliminating dual primaries will end the black-white coalition supporting Demo-
cratic control of the South.24 3 A related concern is that reducing the incentive
to form coalitions in primaries could intensify the racial polarization already
entrenched throughout the South.244
It is unclear, however, that the runoff actually encourages coalitions. Be-
cause white politicians can rely on the high probability that any black candidate
can be defeated in a runoff against a white opponent, the majority vote require-
ment discourages white Democrats from seeking black support whenever serious
black candidates enter primaries. Moreover, real political alliances might de-
237. See Lamis, The Runoff Primary Controversy: Implications for Southern Politics, 17 POL.
Sc. 782, 783-84 (1984).
238. See id.
239. Id. at 784.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See Butler, supra note 147, at 450.
243. Butler, supra note 147, at 450.
244. Butler, supra note 147, at 450.
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velop if the power structure within the Democratic party gave its support and
financial resources to black candidates who win primaries by pluralities.2 45
This, in turn, could weaken racial bloc voting by encouraging white Democrats
who would vote against black candidates in party runoffs to overcome their
prejudices rather than support a Republican.2 46 Efforts by black Democrats to
appeal to mainstream Democrats in general elections would accelerate this
process.
B. Majority Vote Requirements and Extremist Candidates
Another argument put forth by the primary runoff's backers points to ex-
amples of progressive Democrats winning nomination in runoffs after finishing
second to conservative opponents in opening primaries247 and argues that the
majority vote requirement benefits minorities by eliminating right-wing Demo-
crats hostile to minority interests. 24 8 Victories by Mississippi Governor William
Winter and South Carolina Governor Richard Riley,24 9 and losses by Orval
Faubus in Arkansas and Lester Maddox in Georgia are often cited in support of
this argument. 250 It is exceedingly difficult to verify these observations-one
person's moderate is another person's conservative. In all likelihood, examples
of liberal candidates defeated because of the majority vote requirement can be
found for every conservative eliminated in a similar fashion; Frank Porter Gra-
ham's defeat in the 1950 North Carolina senatorial primary is a noteworthy
example.251 Most importantly, the argument that dual primaries should be re-
tained so that white progressives can advance the interests of minorities "fails to
address the discriminatory impact of the rule upon" minorities. 252 In addition
to its paternalistic tone, the argument falters because it fails to recognize that
fair election systems should not force minorities to rely on members of other
races to represent their political interests.253 As Tom Wicker has noted, "it's
hard.., to tell blacks that they should forego their own political ambition lest
they polarize the white majority against them."'254
Southern Democrats also argue that second primaries serve as a "moderat-
ing force" necessary to prevent the nomination of extremist candidates. 2 5
Without a majority vote requirement, the argument goes, large numbers of weak
candidates competing in a primary could result in the emergence of a candidate
245. See Guinier, supra note 217, at 16.
246. Guinier, supra note 217, at 16.
247. See Wicker, The Runoffissue, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1984, at A31, col. 1.
248. See Lamis, supra note 237, at 783.
249. See Wicker, supra note 247.
250. See Lamis, supra note 237, at 783.
251. See Lanier, supra note 78, at 22; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (briefly
discussing Graham's defeat).
252. Hearings, supra note 3, at 41 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
253. Hearings, supra note 3, at 41 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
254. Wicker, supra note 247.
255. Roberts, supra note 1.
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representing only a narrow ideological wing of the party. However, this argu-
ment is unpersuasive. If the nominee proves incapable of attracting the support
of a broader segment of the party, his or her defeat in the general election should
discredit that particular faction of the party, thereby preventing further nomina-
tions. Furthermore, this possibility is an inevitable consequence of electoral
politics that arguably can strengthen parties. The nomination of fringe politi-
cians sometimes injects a stagnant status quo with fresh new ideas. The adop-
tion of Populist ideas by Progressive politicians provides an analogous example
of such an effect. 256
Moreover, the circumstances that create the possibility of nominating ex-
tremist candidates also result in more black nominations. It is in this manner
that eliminating the primary runoff would boost the political strength of black
voters. The support of party officials and resources would help diffuse the irra-
tional racial fears of many white voters and reduce bloc voting.257 As black
politicians seek to attract sufficient votes to win general elections, they may even
be able to disprove the media's crippling, but inevitable, label: "black candi-
date."2 58 More black nominees would increase black political influence by en-
couraging voter participation. Reverend Jackson's recent presidential campaign,
for instance, stimulated unprecedented increases in black voter registration and
turnout.25 9 Conversely, harsh feelings engendered by racially divisive runoffs
are likely to reduce turnout among the losers' supporters-offsetting any gains
associated with enhancing the nominee's mandate.2 60
C. Elimination of Majority Vote Requirements: Help
for the Republican Party?
Two recent elections demonstrate that Democratic party resources and sup-
port can overcome racial bloc voting even when black candidates have not won a
majority of primary votes. In Chicago Harold Washington won nomination by
only a plurality and then defeated his Republican opponent in a racially divisive
general election to become the city's first black mayor. 26 1 Chicago, like most of
the South, is a Democratic stronghold.2 62 Further, racism is by no means
256. See, e.g., C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 369-95.
257. See Wicker, supra note 247; see also Guinier, supra note 217, at 16 (pointing out that party
leaders, forced by custom to remain neutral in primaries, would be able to exercise their influence on
behalf of black candidates in general elections, thereby discouraging crossover voting by dis-
enchanted white voters).
258. In Butts the district court recounted Percy Sutton's expression of his dismay at being "la-
belled a 'Black' candidate expected to gain only the 'Black' vote" after 12 years of successful partici-
pation in Democratic party politics. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1535. Reverend Jackson encountered the
same label in his 1984 presidential bid. See Jackson Assesses Low White Vote, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22,
1984, at B8, col. 1.
259. See Herbers, The New South Warms to Northern Orthodoxies, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1984,
at § 4, col. 3.
260. See Kenney & Rice, The Effect of Primary Divisiveness in Gubernatorial and Senatorial
Elections, 46 J. POL. 904, 914 (1984) (finding that party's chance for success declines as level of
primary divisiveness rises).
261. See Lanier, supra note 78, at 22.
262. See Lanier, supra note 78, at 22.
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trapped in the southern states.2 63 One commentator has noted that the fact
Washington's Republican opponent made such a strong showing in heavily
Democratic Chicago illustrates that Washington would have had a difficult time
defeating incumbent Jane Byrne in a runoff.264 In Virginia, a state that nomi-
nates by caucus instead of by primary, Douglas Wilder relied on the support of
the Democratic establishment to become, in 1985, the South's first black lieuten-
ant governor since Reconstruction.265 Wilder's victory is more impressive when
one considers that, unlike most of the South, Virginia has traditionally harbored
a powerful Republican party.26
6
Nevertheless, many southern Democrats contend that eliminating dual
primaries would strengthen the Republican party in the South.267 Aside from
the fact this view acknowledges that eliminating majority vote requirements
would at least increase the number of black nominations, the argument hardly
excuses the discriminatory effects of this device. It is by no means inevitable
that Democratic candidates better serve the interests of minorities. Further-
more, if a black candidate enters a primary, the majority vote requirement al-
lows white Democrats to ignore black interests until after the primary. And
because Democrats assume that they can rely on minority support, there is little
incentive for Democratic candidates to address minority concerns actively.
268
As James Clyburn has noted, perhaps the Democratic establishment should con-
cern itself with the possibility of an "all-white Democratic party. ' 269 In light of
such attitudes, blacks may find it necessary to seek alternative political outlets.
In Mississippi a number of black candidates have sought to escape the discrimi-
natory consequences of second primaries by running as independents. 270 Minor-
ities in other states may consider similar strategies, or alternatively, they may
exchange their political support for concrete political concessions from Republi-
can candidates. In any event, competition between Democrats and Republicans
would force both parties to contend seriously for black political support. In
short, abolishing runoffs could bring a return to the political situation existing at
the time before the development of runoffs-black political leverage exerted
263. See Lanier, supra note 78, at 22; see also Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1544 ("Contrary to the
popularly held belief that racial discrimination only takes place within the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, plaintiffs' [evidence supports] the finding that Black and Hispanic voters in New York City
have been the subject of various procedures and/or statutes in the recent past which have had the
effect of abridging their voting rights."). But see Butts, 779 F.2d at 150 (rejecting the district court's
finding of past voting rights discrimination against minorities in New York).
264. Lanier, supra note 78, at 22.
265. See Epps, supra note 228.
266. See Epps, supra note 228; see also V. KEY, supra note 14, at 420 (referring to the atypical-
for the South-strength of the Republican party in Virginia).
267. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 1.
268. See Lamis, supra note 237, at 785 (explaining the "fence straddling" skills of southern
Democrats on racial issues).
269. Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 (testimony of James Clyburn, Comm'r, S.C. Human Affairs
Comm'n).
270. Hearings, supra note 3, at 32 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights); see also Lamis, supra note 237, at 785 (noting that Charles Evers ran as an independent and
Mississippi subsequently elected its first Republican Senator since Reconstruction; Evers responded
to criticism by noting that Mississippi Democrats had not- earned black support).
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through a swing vote role.27 1
Most important, if the Democratic party truly stands for legitimate atten-
tion to minority political interests, it should encourage the swift flight of those
Democrats who would vote Republican solely because the Democratic nominee
happens to be from a different race. As the Reverend Jackson reminded dele-
gates at the 1984 Democratic Convention, "you cannot hold someone in the
ditch unless you linger there with them ... 272
D. Alternative Means of Stifling Blacks' Political Influence
Many commentators note that white politicians can achieve the same result
as a majority vote requirement by agreeing in advance on a single white candi-
date to run against any black candidates in a primary.273 Politicians in Thomp-
son, Georgia, recently provided an extreme demonstration of this point.2 7 4
After a black and two whites announced their intent to run for mayor, the city
tried to establish a majority vote requirement. 275 After the Justice Department
rejected the change under section five of the Voting Rights Act, each white can-
didate selected twelve persons to represent them in a meeting to determine
which of the white politicians would contest the black candidate.2 7 6 The candi-
date selected withdrew after the other politician failed to abide by the deci-
sion. 2 7 7 The white candidate then prevailed in the general election. 278
Without doubt, such "pre-primary brokering" 279 will take place if runoffs
are discarded. Nevertheless, procedures designed to achieve similar results have
no place in a fair electoral system. Instead, politicians willing to resort openly to
such racist schemes should be forced to slither through their own bigotry. As
the South grows accustomed to the profound changes initiated by the Civil
Rights movement, and as the time approaches when most southern voters will
have been educated in integrated schools, one can only hope that such tactics
will soon lead to the defeat of those politicians willing to stoop so low. In addi-
tion, as the Thompson display demonstrates, the political egos of politicians are
often greater than their prejudices: the candidate rejected by the clique ignored
its decision. In fact, fear "that the self-interest of opposition politicians might,
as it had during Reconstruction and the Populist eras, overcome their devotion
to white supremacy" led to the development of the runoff in the first place. 28 0
E. Nominating Consensus Candidates
Proponents of second primaries also contend that the device helps parties
271. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
272. Jackson, supra note 225.
273. See Lanier, supra note 78, at 23; McDonald, supra note 6, at 435.
274. See McDonald, supra note 6, at 435.
275. McDonald, supra note 6, at 435.
276. McDonald, supra note 6, at 435.
277. McDonald, supra note 6, at 435-36.
278. McDonald, supra note 6, at 436.
279. Lanier, supra note 78, at 23.
280. Kousser, supra note 9, at 393.
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select consensus candidates.28 l In a recent Texas senatorial primary, only 2024
votes separated the top 3 candidates. 282 A recent New Jersey primary ended
after Thomas Kean defeated James Florio by less than one percent of the
vote.283 These examples demonstrate that primaries decided by pluralities often
do not necessarily indicate the candidate favored by most party members. How-
ever, a majority vote requirement does not guarantee this end. A runoff conceiv-
ably could be decided by one vote; how could a nominee so selected be
considered a more decisive winner than a victor in a close race decided by a
plurality? Most importantly, because turnout typically drops in a runoff,284 it
sometimes happens that a candidate finishing second in an initial primary wins
the runoff with fewer votes than his or her opponent received in the initial pri-
mary. In North Carolina's 1978 Democratic primary for the United States Sen-
ate, John Ingram finished second in the first primary and then won the runoff
with 16,000 fewer votes than Luther Hodges had received in the initial pri-
mary.285 The marginal-and questionable-benefits associated with enhancing
the winning margin of a party's nominee do not justify the runoff's discrimina-
tory impact.
Many opponents of the majority vote requirement suggest lowering the
percentage of votes needed to win nomination from fifty percent to forty per-
cent.286 This proposal, offered in a spirit of political compromise, placates sev-
eral concerns held by southern Democrats: the desirability of presenting strong
candidates in the general election, the related need to attract the support of a
substantial percentage of party members, and the goal of ascertaining the party's
choice.287 Even assuming that the runoff is necessary to meet these ends or that
these goals are so important that they must be pursued at the expense of black
political power, lowering the threshold of support necessary for nomination
from fifty to forty percent would not reduce the discriminatory consequences of
the runoff enough to justify its retention. Certainly, a forty percent rule would
have altered the outcome in the most egregious instances of the majority vote
requirement's discriminatory results. As the district court recognized in Butts,
however, any threshold requirement that is significantly higher than the percent-
age of minorities in the election district severely hinders minority candidates-
281. See, eg., The Reason for Runoffs, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1984, at A30, col. 1 (arguing that
the runoff prevents narrow ideological factions from nominating candidates unacceptable to majority
of party members).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. In the 23 runoffs for Congress or for statewide elections held in North Carolina between
1950 and 1982, voter turnout dropped in 18 of the second primaries. Lanier, supra note 78, at 21. In
these 18 runoffs, turnout averaged 82.5% of that in the initial primaries. Id. It should be noted,
however, that confrontations between black and white candidates often stimulate higher turnout.
See Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1545; Bullock, Racial Cross-Over Voting and the Election of Black Offi-
cials, 46 J. POL. Sci. 238, 245 (1984).
285. Lanier, supra note 78, at 21.
286. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 59 (testimony of James Clyburn, Comm'r, S.C. Human Af-
fairs Comm'n).
287. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 101, 105 (recounting general debate regarding threshold
percentage).
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so long as racially polarized voting persists.288 The study of runoffs in North
Carolina concluded that only a return to a "plurality system... [would] reduce
barriers to the nomination of blacks and females in a significant way."' 289 Fur-
thermore, as one commentator has noted, a threshold requirement is inherently
suspect because the percentage device operates without reference to the number
of eligible voters who may participate in a given election. 290 No one seriously
suggests ignoring the outcome of elections "because only 25 percent of those
who are eligible to vote go out and vote."'291
F. Majority Vote Requirements and At-Large Elections
Most commentators regard the at-large method 292 of election as the most
serious impediment to black political power.293 Voting rights litigation has
therefore focused on this procedure, and the remedy following successful suits is
generally the creation of single-member districts with black majorities.2 94 In
these newly established wards the majority vote requirement enhances the power
of blacks at the expense of whites, just as the opposite result occurs in white
majority districts. Laughlin McDonald, Director of the Southern Regional Of-
fice of the American Civil Liberties Union, argues that because whites in white
majority districts could achieve the same effect as a majority vote requirement
by selecting consensus candidates, and because the rule benefits blacks in black
majority districts, "elimination of the rule does not emerge as a priority in the
campaign against minority vote dilution. '295 He adds that "generally it is only
in at-large elections where the majority vote requirement is objectionable. ' 296
McDonald's position that the discriminatory effects of runoffs are felt pri-
marily in at-large elections unnecessarily confines voting rights litigation to a
straitjacket fastened by success. At-large elections are not intrinsically discrimi-
natory;297 rather, it is their operation in the context of anti-single-shot provi-
288. See Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1552, 1555-56.
289. Lanier, supra note 78, at 22.
290. Hearings, supra note 3, at 110 (testimony of Steve Suitts, Executive Director, Southern
Regional Council).
291. Hearings, supra note 3, at 110 (testimony of Steve Suitts, Executive Director, Southern
Regional Council).
292. See supra note 135 (discussing problems created by at-large voting scheme).
293. McDonald, supra note 6, at 439.
294. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 615-16; Hearings, supra note 3, at 82 (testimony of Laughlin Mc-
Donald, Director, Southern Regional Office, ACLU).
295. McDonald, supra note 6, at 439; see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 90-91 (testimony of
Laughlin McDonald, Director, Southern Regional Office, ACLU) (presenting same argument). Mc-
Donald nevertheless concludes that numerous examples of minorities losing in runoffs after winning
pluralities in primaries suggest that majority vote requirements potentially dilute the political influ-
ence of minorities. McDonald, supra note 6, at 432-33 & n.15.
296. McDonald, supra note 6, at 439; see also Butler, supra note 147, at 442-43 (emphasizing
that attention should focus on the electoral system as a whole, but noting that most commentators
agree that the election unit-at-large or district-is the "most important element of the election
structure in terms of its potential impact on the election of minority-supported candidates"). Mc-
Donald recognizes, however, that second primaries may be objectionable in particular congressional
districts or states. McDonald, supra note 6, at 432 & n.15.
297. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 31-33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 177, 193, 209-11.
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sions-including majority vote requirements-that submerges the political
power of minorities.298 By contrast, second primaries always enhance whatever
potential for discrimination exists in a particular electoral system.299
Moreover, creating majority black single-member districts is not a fool-
proof method of correcting vote dilution. Of eighty-six counties in the South
with majority black populations, only thirteen are controlled by black politi-
cians. 300 Almost one-half of these counties have never elected blacks to of-
fice.301 In addition, relying solely on single-member districts may lessen the
incentive to form bi-racial coalitions. 30 2
Perhaps at-large elections and majority vote requirements should be re-
garded as components of an electoral system that disadvantages minorities. In
that case, the discriminatory impact may be alleviated by alternative remedies:
drawing single-member districts, eliminating majority vote requirements and
other anti-single-shot mechanisms thereby enabling minorities to elect represent-
atives in rough proportion to their numbers by relying on bloc voting for se-
lected candidates, or creating a system that includes single-member as well as at-
large positions.30 3
In certain localities political circumstances may call for either at-large elec-
tions, single-member districts, or a combination of at-large and single-member
positions.304 Tailoring the remedy for discriminatory election systems to fit lo-
cal political factors provides flexibility in establishing fair electoral schemes,
which in turn could result in maximum political leverage for minorities.30 5 To
illustrate, when political organizations capable of delivering bloc votes are in
existence, at-large election might provide greater access to power for minority
groups. A black political group could organize its voters behind a designated
number of black candidates and then agree to align with a progressive slating
organization behind particular consensus candidates. The 1985 Durham, North
Carolina, city elections demonstrate the feasibility of such an approach.30 6 The
298. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 615-16, 627.
299. It is generally acknowledged that majority vote requirements accentuate the potential for
discrimination that exists in an electoral system. See Gingles, 106 S. Ct. at 2752. The extent of such
enhancement differs depending on local circumstances. The Supreme Court in Gingles emphasized
that "electoral devices ... may not be considered per se violative of § 2." Id. at 2764. Whether a
particular runoff dilutes minority voters' influence depends on its operation in a specific setting. See
id. at 2764-65.
300. Stekler, supra note 226, at 473 n.1.
301. Stekler, supra note 226, at 473 n.l.
302. See Thurnstrom, "Voting Rights" Trap, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 25, 1985, at 21, 23.
McDonald argues, however, that single-member districts actually promote coalition politics by en-
abling minorities to enter "the political mainstream." Letter from Laughlin McDonald to the editor
of THE NEW REPUBLIC (unpublished, Oct. 9, 1985) (criticizing Thurnstrom's opinion); Letter from
Laughlin McDonald to William Simpson (Oct. 9, 1986) (making the same argument).
303. See City of Port Arthur, 459 U.S. at 167; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 183-84 & n.19 (1980) (containing detailed explanation of single-shot voting).
304. See City of Port Arthur, 459 U.S. at 167.
305. Because of the intensely local nature of the decision, local minority voters and political
leaders should determine which type of electoral system would best enable them to overcome dilu-
tive mechanisms.
306. A 12 member city council and a mayor govern Durham. 1 DURHAM, N.C., MUN. CODE
ch. II, § 5 (1982). Six council seats are at-large and six correspond to numbered wards. Id. Every
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Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People teamed with two white pro-
gressive organizations-the Durham Voters Alliance and the People's Alli-
ance-to win four of six council seats up for election, as well as the mayor's
post.307 The coalition supports nine of the twelve councilmembers and the
mayor;308 five of the councilmembers are black.30 9 Under similar political cir-
cumstances single-shot voting in at-large elections, combined with bi-racial co-
alitions, could lead to greater influence than bloc voting in single-member
districts.
McDonald's conclusion that runoffs discriminate primarily in at-large elec-
tions understates the discriminatory impact of majority vote requirements in
statewide elections and in most congressional districts. By definition, no state
has a majority of minority citizens. Of 116 congressional districts in the South,
only 4 have black majorities. 3 10 Fourteen districts, however, have black popula-
tions of thirty percent or more.311 Eliminating dual primaries for statewide elec-
tions and congressional elections would enable minorities to participate more
effectively in political contests in these districts.
The suggestion that majority vote requirements are somehow justifiable in
majority black districts, but not in majority white districts, cannot be defended
persuasively. The majority group has an inherent political advantage; fairness
dictates that such advantage not be unduly emphasized at the expense of minori-
ties-whatever their skin color. The right of citizens "to have [their votes]
counted at full value without dilution or discount" 3 12 is too fundamental to yield
to the majority's interest in further stacking the political deck in its favor. Once
it is established that runoffs discriminate against racial minorities, minority vot-
two years elections are held for mayor, for three of the numbered seats, and for three of the at-large
seats. Id. A nonpartisan primary achieves an effect similar to that of a majority vote requirement by
narrowing the field to either two for the single-member districts or to six for the at-large seats. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-294 (1982); 1 DURHAM, N.C., MUN. CODE ch. II, § 3 (1982). Durham's
method of election is not represented as a model; the effectiveness of the bi-racial coalition merely
illustrates that at-large election systems enable strategies and political influence not available in sin-
gle-member districts. A more flexible approach avoids writing off the political aspirations of those
racial minorities and interest groups who live in districts where they do not form a majority.
307. Morris, Durham's Biracial Coalition Makes History, N.C. Independent, Nov. 8-21, 1985, at
5, col. 1, 12, col. 1.
308. Id. at 12, col. 2.
309. Id.
310. Hearings, supra note 3, at 71 (testimony of Steve Suitts, Executive Director, Southern Re-
gional Council).
311. Hearings, supra note 3, at 72 (testimony of Steve Suitts, Executive Director, Southern Re-
gional Council). Dr Martin Luther King, Jr., argued against political strategies that would isolate
the black community and in favor of efforts to build coalitions. He reasoned:
[ e do not have to look far to see that effective political power for Negroes cannot come
through separatism. Granted that there are cities and counties in the country where the
Negro is in a majority, they are so few that concentration on them alone would still leave
the vast majority of Negroes outside the mainstream of American political life.
M. KING, JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 48 (1967). Dr. King
also posed the following rhetorical question: "Is it a sounder program to concentrate on the election
of two or three Negro Congressmen from predominately Negro districts or to concentrate on the
election of fifteen or twenty Negro Congressmen from Southern districts where a coalition of Negro
and white moderate voters is possible?" Id. at 49.
312. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555, n.29, quoted in S. REP. No. 417,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 196-97.
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ers seeking their elimination should be willing to forego whatever advantage the
device provides in districts populated by a majority of minority voters.3 13 If
majority white districts are to be expected to elect the best candidate irrespective
of race, majority black districts should be expected to do the same. Moreover, as
is true in reverse circumstances, when a majority black community is divided
between two black candidates, it cannot be said that either of the two is intrinsi-
cally preferred to a white plurality winner. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
recognized, "[A]ny program that elects all black candidates simply because they
are black and rejects all white candidates simply because they are white is politi-
cally unsound and morally unjustifiable."'3 14
In sum, a number of political factors must be considered when discussing
the elimination of majority vote requirements. Similarly, additional factors must
be considered when discussing alternative solutions to the problem of the diluted
political influence of blacks. Furthermore, a number of arguments have been
put forth to justify the continued existence of majority vote requirements.
Although many of these arguments have merit and warrant consideration, they
do not present adequate justification for maintaining majority vote requirements.
In light of the disparate impact such requirements have on minority voters and
candidates, only very strong reasons should justify their continued existence.
The reasons put forth by supporters of the primary runoff are simply inadequate.
V. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the history behind majority vote requirements, it appears
that white Democrats designed them to suppress the black political power re-
maining after disenfranchisement and to ensure that black political influence
would not resurface. Today, this discriminatory device works as well as ever.
Second primaries continue to shackle black candidates and to dilute the votes of
their supporters. Such runoffs enhance racially polarized voting-vesting the
most racist of white Democrats with veto power over nominations of black can-
didates. Apologists for this electoral scheme point primarily to a "need" to en-
hance the inherent strength of party majorities which, in the context of
persistent racial bloc voting, necessarily denies racial minorities equal access to
political power.
In some states primary runoffs may be vulnerable to constitutional attack.
However, the convincing evidence necessary to support a constitutional chal-
lenge will be difficult to unearth. In other states, majority vote requirements
may not survive scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act. Evidence of the discrim-
inatory impact outlawed by the Voting Rights Act is more readily available;
however, the task of proving racially disparate effects for each class of elections
is enormous. 315 Furthermore, the court of appeals' decision in Butts indicates
313. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 95-97 (expressing criticism of McDonald's proposed double
standard); see also id. at 99-100 (testimony of Victor McTeer taking similar position).
314. M. KING, JR., supra note 311, at 49.
315. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177, 183.
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just how difficult it is to challenge a primary runoff successfully under either the
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. In Butts the district court found that
New York City's primary runoff law violated both the Constitution and the Vot-
ing Rights Act.3 16 However, the court of appeals, in no uncertain terms, re-
jected both of the district court's holdings.3 17 In short, case-by- case litigation is
expensive and time-consuming and is not a proven means of eliminating "one of
the oldest guarantees of southern white political domination. '318
State legislation is one alternative to case-by-case litigation. However, this
alternative is unlikely to produce more satisfactory results. A proposal to
change North Carolina's majority vote requirement to a forty percent require-
ment died in committee.319 This result is probably typical of the reception
measures abolishing second primaries would receive in most southern states.
Obviously, state legislators have managed to win election under current electoral
schemes, and runoffs generally add to the incumbency advantage.320 As a re-
sult, federal legislation may present the best solution to the problem.321 Con-
gress has the authority to enact such a provision, 322 and federal legislation
would provide the most effective and efficient vehicle for lifting the burden of the
primary runoff from minority candidates and their supporters. More impor-
tantly, such action may be necessary if a solution is to be found for the problems
created by majority vote requirements.
Aristotle wrote: "If liberty and equality ... are chiefly to be founded in
democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the govern-
316. Butts, 614 F. Supp. at 1548-50.
317. Butts, 779 F.2d at 145-51.
318. Hearings, supra note 3, at 43 (testimony of Victor McTeer, Center for Constitutional
Rights).
319. Lanier, supra note 78, at 19.
320. See Roberts, supra note 1.
321. A strategy seeking to eliminate majority vote requirements through litigation could elimi-
nate runoffs in those electoral units in which they operate most invidiously while preserving the
supposed advantages of second primaries in majority black districts. See generally McDonald, supra
note 6 (concluding that runoffs benefit blacks in black majority districts and that eliminating major-
ity vote requirements is not a priority, but recognizing that particular second primary provisions
may dilute minority political power). This Note's conclusion rests on a policy determination that,
given the inherent uncertainty and delay of case-by-case litigation, the potential increased influence
of minority voters in districts populated primarily by bloc voting whites justifies complete abrogation
of majority vote requirements- even if that means requiring black voters in majority black districts
to forego the dubious advantages of second primaries. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 99 (testimony
of Lorn Foster, Senior Fellow, Joint Center for Pol. Studies) (making the identical argument).
322. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). In Katzenbach the Supreme Court
held that the fifteenth amendment allowed Congress to suspend the use of literacy tests to qualify
voters and to appoint federal examiners charged with protecting the franchise of black voters. Id. at
333-36. In reaching this decision the Court noted that "Congress has full remedial powers to effectu-
ate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting." Id. at 326. The Court
further noted, " 'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
[consistent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.'" Id. (quoting McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321 (1819)).
On June 12, 1984, United States Representative John Conyers introduced a bill that would have
amended the Voting Rights Act to prohibit majority vote requirements. H.R. 5822, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984). The 98th Congress took no action on the bill, and representative Conyers reintroduced
the amendment on March 28, 1985. H.R. 1785, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
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ment to the utmost. ' 3 2 3 Discarding dual primaries would breathe new life into
this time-honored principle-a principle that southern Democrats have ignored
for far too long. Furthermore, fairer electoral schemes would allow the South to
benefit from the skills and services of its best leaders-regardless of their race. 3 2 4
WILLIAM SIMPSON
323. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOK II, quoted in Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1300.
324. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 61 (testimony of James Clyburn, Comm'r, S.C. Human Af-
fairs Comm'n).
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